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Privacy Losses as Wrongful Gains
Bernard Chao*
ABSTRACT: Perhaps nowhere has the pace of technology placed more
pressure on the law than in the area of data privacy. Huge data breaches fill
our headlines. Companies often violate their own privacy policies by selling
customer data, or by using the information in ways that fall outside their
policy. Yet, even when there is indisputable misconduct, the law generally does
not hold these companies accountable. That is because traditional legal claims
are poorly suited for handling privacy losses.
Contract claims fail when privacy policies are not considered contractual
obligations. Misrepresentation claims cannot succeed when customers never
read and rely on those policies. The economic loss rule thwarts many
negligence claims. But undoubtedly the thorniest obstacle is that privacy
harms are often not considered cognizable injuries under many common legal
theories. Tort, contract, and constitutional standing doctrine all demand
some form of concrete injury, but privacy injuries are often too intangible or
risk-based to qualify. Thus, no matter how blatantly a company violates its
privacy obligations or how porous a company’s data security is, the victims’
lawsuit is often perfunctorily dismissed.
While many commentators have persuasively argued that we should modify
these doctrines to better accommodate privacy harms, this Article takes a
different tack and revives an old, neglected common law approach to address
these modern ills. Privacy victims should use the oft-misunderstood law of
restitution and unjust enrichment to disgorge the wrongful gains companies
earn when they break their privacy policies. This theory also will allow victims
to recover any wrongful savings companies retain when they fail to take
reasonable data security precautions and instead use deficient cybersecurity.
Because unjust enrichment focuses on the defendant’s wrongful gain and not
the plaintiff’s injury, this theory can avoid many of the pitfalls associated
with the more conventional causes of action privacy plaintiffs typically raise.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps nowhere has the pace of technology placed more pressure on
the law than in the area of data privacy. Huge data breaches fill our headlines.
Companies often violate their own privacy policies by selling customer data or
by using the information in ways that fall outside their policy. Yet even when
there is indisputable misconduct, the law generally does not hold these
companies accountable. That is because traditional legal claims are poorly
suited for handling privacy losses.
Contract claims fail when privacy policies are not considered contractual
obligations. Misrepresentation claims cannot succeed when customers never
read and rely on those policies. The economic loss rule (which disallows
recovery for purely economic injuries) thwarts many negligence claims. But
undoubtedly the thorniest obstacle is that privacy harms are often not
considered cognizable injuries under conventional legal theories. Tort,
contract, and constitutional standing doctrine all demand some form of
concrete injury, but privacy injuries are often too intangible or risk-based to
qualify. Thus, no matter how blatantly a company violates its privacy
obligations or how porous a company’s data security, the victims’ lawsuit is
often perfunctorily dismissed.
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Many commentators have persuasively argued that we should modify
these doctrines to better accommodate privacy harms.1 Others hope that
legislation can solve some of these problems.2 Both approaches are entirely
sensible. But this Article advocates a less fashionable approach that has the
potential for more immediate relief. That is because it does not rely on
changing current law or enacting new laws. Rather the approach seeks to
revive a legal theory that is well rooted in the common law. Specifically, this
Article suggests that privacy victims should use the often-misunderstood law
of restitution and unjust enrichment to disgorge wrongful gains companies
earn when they break their privacy policies. This theory supplies both the basis
for a more viable cause of action for data privacy plaintiffs and a workable
remedy. Employing this theory will also allow victims to recover any wrongful
savings companies retain when they fail to take reasonable data security
precautions and instead use deficient cybersecurity. Because unjust
enrichment focuses on the defendant’s wrongful gain and not the plaintiff’s
injury, this theory can avoid many of the pitfalls associated with the more
common causes of action privacy plaintiffs typically raise.
Part II of this Article describes the legal obstacles current privacy
victims face in contract law, tort law, and constitutional standing doctrine.
These obstacles include failing to recognize privacy policies as contractual
obligations; the fact that victims rarely read and rely on privacy policies; and
the economic loss rule. However, by far the thorniest obstacle is the nature of
privacy victims’ harms. Contract law, tort law, and constitutional standing
doctrine all demand concrete injuries. But privacy harms are often too
intangible and probabilistic in nature (i.e., it is probable but not certain that
the loss of sensitive personal information will lead to identity theft or credit
card fraud). Moreover, when a more concrete harm does manifest, it is hard
to show that any particular wrongful act “caused” the injury. As a result, many
otherwise meritorious privacy claims are dismissed at the pleading stage.
Part III of this Article then explains how the law of restitution and unjust
enrichment can address the concerns described in Part II. Section III.A starts
by explaining how disgorgement should be used as remedy in breach of
contract claims. Disgorgement gives the plaintiff a monetary remedy based
on the defendant’s wrongful gains as opposed to the plaintiff’s injury.
Disgorgement is often used when expectation damages are inadequate or

1. See M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1132–35 (2011);
Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX.
L. REV. 737, 744–46 (2018).
2. See Eric Goldman, What We’ve Learned from California’s Consumer Privacy Act so Far, HILL
(Jan. 11, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/477821-what-weve-learnedfrom-the-california-consumer-privacy-act-so-far [https://perma.cc/6VDB-B47K] (arguing that
Congress needs to enact uniform privacy laws); Peter M. Lefkowitz, Why America Needs a Thoughtful
Federal Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/
opinion/congress-privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/8TQ3-Z7LJ].
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simply difficult to assess. Because privacy injuries confound other traditional
doctrines, disgorgement is particularly well suited to address these problems.
Section III.B then explains that unjust enrichment is not just a remedy but
also an independent source of liability. Thus, applying disgorgement to
privacy harms does not rely on a privacy policy being a contractual obligation.
Part III also describes how courts have misunderstood the doctrine of
unjust enrichment. Some courts incorrectly assert that unjust enrichment
cannot exist when the parties have a contract.3 Other courts have said that
unjust enrichment is not an independent cause of action but instead only
exists as a remedy (e.g., for breach of contract).4 Paradoxically, some courts
have actually taken both these views, although not within the same case.5
Depending on which decision one reads, an unjust enrichment claim fails
because parties have a contract, or conversely, it fails because parties lack a
contract. Both understandings are wrong. But unfortunately, these mistaken
understandings have frustrated the ability of privacy victims to bring unjust
enrichment claims. This Article seeks to clarify this area of the law so courts
do not perpetuate these mistakes.
Because the law of restitution and unjust enrichment is flexible and far
reaching, it is quite possible that it might expand to involve other “wrongs.”
Section IV.A identifies some additional potential “wrongs” that might serve as
the basis for an unjust enrichment claim. These include both statutory privacy
violations and violations of fiduciary duties. Both theories are natural
extensions for the application of unjust enrichment in privacy law.
Section IV.B then discusses an important limitation on the theory of
unjust enrichment, the ability to bargain around the remedy. However, the
ability to contract out of unjust enrichment is not unbounded. Clauses
that seek to avoid liability for gross negligence or seek to avoid statutory
obligations are typically invalid. If the defendant’s privacy wrong can be fairly
characterized as either gross negligence or as a statutory violation, the ability
to contract out of unjust enrichment will likely fail. Thus, while the first step
toward widespread adaptation of unjust enrichment in privacy law may lie in
contract, the doctrine’s future viability may depend on victims’ ability to
find other “wrongs” that cannot be contracted around. Finally, Section IV.C
identifies complexities in calculating the proper amount of disgorgement.
II. PRIVACY LOSSES AND LEGAL OBSTACLES
Both contract and tort law present a series of obstacles to privacy victims
who seek relief in court. Unfortunately, these obstacles have little to do with
the underlying merits of the victims’ grievances. Even when a company has
unmistakably broken a privacy promise or engaged in shoddy cybersecurity

3.
4.
5.

See infra Section III.B for examples.
See infra Section III.C for examples.
See infra Section III.C.
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that has led to the loss of sensitive personal information, the company can
often avoid liability. This is because traditional common law theories are not
well suited to address the way privacy losses occur and the kinds of injuries
their victims suffer. Breach of contract claimants have difficulty showing that
a given promise is part of the contract. Misrepresentation claims fail because
no one reads and relies on the broken promises. Causation is a problem for
any harm that allegedly resulted from a data breach. But the most significant
obstacle is the nature of the privacy victims’ injuries. Regardless of whether
the claim is based in contract, tort, or even state statutory law (e.g., unfair
competition laws), a necessary element is damages. Courts often consider
privacy harms to be too intangible or amorphous to recognize.
Recent developments in standing doctrine have only made these
problems worse.6 Under the Constitution, courts only have jurisdiction over
lawsuits when the plaintiff has standing.7 The Supreme Court has held
that standing requires that a plaintiff be able to show the defendant caused
the plaintiff to suffer a tangible and concrete injury.8 Unfortunately, the
amorphous nature of privacy injuries often means that victims have no
standing.9 The following two Sections explain why privacy plaintiffs have
trouble satisfying the requirements of contract law and tort law. The third
Section then explains why standing doctrine also presents unique challenges
to privacy victims.
A. CONTRACT LAW
Companies commonly make two kinds of privacy promises. These
promises are often found in their privacy policies.10 First, companies promise
to limit how they use or disclose their customers’ data (privacy promises).
Second, companies often promise to take reasonable measures to secure
customer data (cybersecurity promises). Unfortunately, companies have

6. Venkat Balasubramani, 9th Circuit Affirms Rejection of Data Breach Claims Against Gap
—Ruiz v. Gap, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (June 4, 2010), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/
2010/06/9th_circuit_aff.htm [https://perma.cc/BJ87-AH4T] (noting that a few cases that
found cognizable injury went on to be dismissed for lack of Article III standing).
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
8. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548–49 (2016).
9. Thomas D. Haley, Data Protection in Disarray, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (2020) (“Even
where defendants have clearly acted illegally, federal courts routinely dismiss data-protection
lawsuits for lack of standing.”).
10. Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal
Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 593 (2007) (“By 2001, virtually all of the most popular
commercial websites had privacy notices . . . .”). The California Online Privacy Protection Act
(“CalOPPA”) requires companies that operate websites that collect personal information from
California consumers to post their privacy policy. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2014).
Other federal statutes regulate privacy policies for certain types of industries (e.g., HIPAA for
health care and Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act for banking).
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frequently violated both their privacy promises and their cybersecurity
promises.
A prominent example of a privacy promise involves the four major
wireless carriers. Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint have all promised to
stop selling location data to third parties.11 Ring, a maker of doorbells that
contain digital cameras, has promised it will only use customer video
recordings for research and development unless customers first make the
recordings public or otherwise give consent.12
One might think that only fly-by-night companies would violate their own
policies on how they use or share customer data. But Facebook, Walmart,
Google, and even the American Association of Retired Persons (“AARP”) have
all been accused of sharing customer data with third parties in violation of
their own policies.13 Part of the problem may stem from the complexity of
modern technology services. For some online services, it may be unclear when
they are sending user ID’s or browsing histories. Part of the problem may be
bureaucratic. Employees designing customer services may be unaware of their
employer’s privacy commitments. But regardless of the underlying cause,
broken promises should have consequences. For example, when customers
store family photos online only to learn that their host company started using
the photos to train facial recognition technology for law enforcement and the
military, the company should face liability.14 The law should hold responsible
companies that disclose personal information to third parties against the
customer’s wishes.15 Customers find these behaviors objectionable yet can
rarely hold companies accountable.
In addition to privacy promises, companies also regularly make
cybersecurity promises. For example, General Motors’ privacy policy states:

11. See Jon Brodkin, After Broken Promise, AT&T Says It’ll Stop Selling Phone Location Data, ARS
TECHNICA (Jan. 11, 2019, 11:20 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/01/after-brokenpromise-att-says-itll-stop-selling-phone-location-data [https://perma.cc/5VKC-CRM6].
12. See Privacy, RING, https://shop.ring.com/pages/privacy (last visited Nov. 16, 2020).
13. See, e.g., Cappello v. Walmart Inc., 394 F. Supp. 3d 1015, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(accusing Walmart of sharing customer information with Facebook in violation of its own policy
which required customers to “opt in” to the sharing of personal information); Svenson v. Google
Inc., No. 13-cv-04080-BLF, 2015 WL 1503429, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2015) (accusing Google
of sharing private customer information with App vendors in violation of Google Wallet’s privacy
policy); Austin-Spearman v. AARP, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2015) (accusing AARP of sharing
personally identifiable information with Facebook and Adobe in violation of AARP’s privacy policy).
14. Ever, a company that stored customer’s photos, began using the photos to train facial
recognition technology. The company changed its privacy policy after NBC reached out to the
company to inquire about the practice. Olivia Solon & Cyrus Farivar, Millions of People Uploaded
Photos to the Ever App. Then the Company Used Them to Develop Facial Recognition Tools., NBC NEWS
(May 9, 2019, 3:10 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/millions-people-uploadedphotos-ever-app-then-company-used-them-n1003371 [https://perma.cc/RP3H-5QUK].
15. See, e.g., Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 906–08 (8th Cir. 2016) (alleging
defendant violated its own privacy policy by disclosing personally identifiable information with
Facebook).
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“We maintain reasonable and adequate technical, administrative, and
physical security and confidentiality measures designed to help protect your
information from unauthorized access or acquisition.”16 Perhaps, it is less
surprising to hear that companies regularly break their cybersecurity
promises. The headlines are full of stories of well-known companies that have
lost customer data due to inexcusable cybersecurity. Equifax lost the personal
data of 143 million people because it did not update its system with a data
patch that was available for more than two months prior to the breach.17 In
2018, Marriott disclosed sensitive personal information, including 5.25
million unencrypted passport numbers, on approximately 383 million
customers.18 Apparently the attackers had been in the Starwood network since
2014 and should have been detected years earlier.19 A report by the Internet
Society’s Online Trust Alliance found that 95 percent of breaches in 2018
were preventable,20 but the list of offenders that could have easily avoided data
breaches keeps growing.21
Despite these broken promises, victims typically have trouble bringing
successful breach of contract claims. The problem is that the traditional
breach of contract claim is not a good fit for privacy policy violations. There
are three significant obstacles. First, privacy promises are not always part of
the customer’s contract with the company. Courts often require the promises
to be somehow incorporated in the customer contract to be enforceable.22 If

16. Privacy Statement, GEN. MOTORS (Jan. 2020), https://www.gm.com/privacy-statement.html.
17. Lily Hay Newman, Equifax Officially Has No Excuse, WIRED (Sept. 14, 2017, 1:27 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-breach-no-excuse [https://perma.cc/44F8-YVER].
18. Ben Popken, Marriott Reveals 5 Million Unencrypted Passport Numbers Were Leaked in 2018
Data Breach, NBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2019, 11:24 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/
marriott-reveals-5-million-unencrypted-passport-numbers-were-leaked-2018-n954791 [https://
perma.cc/74KF-3VZ7].
19. See Robert McMillan, Marriott’s Starwood Missed Chance to Detect Huge Data Breach Years
Earlier, Cybersecurity Specialists Say, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2018, 5:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/marriotts-starwood-missed-chance-to-detect-huge-data-breach-years-earlier-1543788659
[https://perma.cc/R7WK-KJGY]; Zack Whittaker, Marriott Now Says 5 Million Unencrypted Passport
Numbers Were Stolen in Starwood Hotel Data Breach, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 4, 2019, 11:11 AM), https://
techcrunch.com/2019/01/04/marriott-five-million-passport-numbers-stolen-starwood [https://
perma.cc/AG6R-WD86].
20. ONLINE TR. ALL., 2018 CYBER INCIDENT & BREACH TRENDS REPORT 3 (2019),
https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/OTA-Incident-Breach-TrendsReport_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6PV-XY4Y].
21. See István Molnár, How 2019’s Worst Corporate Hacks Could Have Been Prevented,
INFOSECURITY (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/blogs/worst-corporatehacks-prevented [https://perma.cc/N7EB-BJZF].
22. See, e.g., In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 916, 920 (N.D. Cal.
2017) (finding promise not to track logged-out users was not part of plaintiffs’ contract with
Facebook), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956
F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020); Austin-Spearman v. AARP, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]he
promises made in AARP’s Privacy Policy were not a part of Austin-Spearman’s binding AARP
membership contract.”); In re Nw. Airlines Priv. Litig., No. Civ.04-126(PAM/JSM), 2004 WL
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they are not, the company has not breached any contractual obligation.23
Thus, companies can make empty promises that make their business practices
appear responsible. But they are not penalized for failing to honor these
promises. Second, victims of data breaches may have trouble proving
causation. If the alleged injury is identity theft or credit card fraud, it is often
difficult to trace that injury to the defendant’s specific breach.24 Ironically, the
fact that so many companies suffer from data breaches helps shield individual
companies from liability. To date, when causation has come up in the context
of pretrial motions, privacy victims have often been able to satisfy the laxer
pleading standards.25 However, it is unclear what level of proof will be
necessary at trial.26 Each of the first two obstacles is significant and can cause
a court to dismiss an otherwise meritorious privacy claim. But by far the largest
problem is that courts have found that the type of injuries that privacy victims
suffer are not cognizable contract law injuries.
In an effort to overcome this problem, privacy victims have tried to
characterize their injuries in several distinct ways regardless of which cause of
action they are using.27 This Article addresses privacy injuries first with respect
to contracts, but privacy victims identify the same kinds of injuries in support

1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) (“The privacy statement on Northwest’s website did not
constitute a unilateral contract.”).
23. There is a vigorous debate about whether courts actually treat privacy policies as
contractual obligations. Compare Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler,
Searching for the Common Law: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 84
U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 25–30 (2017) (explaining the methodology and results of a study conducted
by the Reporters for the new Restatement of Consumer Contracts, which found that courts
recognize privacy policies as contracts), with Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the
Restatement of Consumer Contract Law, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 45, 49 (2019) (reanalyzing the data
from the Reporters’ study and concluding that the data does not support their conclusions).
Klass’ findings appear more consistent with the observations of privacy scholars. See infra notes
33–38 and accompanying text (discussing how contract law has not played much role in privacy
law).
24. See Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[T]o prove that a
data breach caused identity theft, the pleadings must include allegations of a nexus between the
two instances beyond allegations of time and sequence.”); Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Health Care
All., 254 F. App’x 664, 668 (9th Cir. 2007) (requiring plaintiff to show a causal relationship
between the burglary of computers and the plaintiff’s identity theft).
25. See In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 953, 987 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(“[A]llegations . . . that each [p]laintiff had his or her [personal information] stolen, and that
specific aspects . . . were used for illicit financial gain after the breach . . . establish the requisite
logical and temporal connection necessary to demonstrate causation.”); Resnick, 693 F.3d at
1327–28 (“Because their contention that the data breach caused the identity theft is plausible
under the facts pled, [p]laintiffs meet the pleading standard . . . .”).
26. Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, P.A., 837 S.E.2d 310, 316 n.6 (Ga. 2019) (“Proving
that the plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by the breach may also be more difficult.”).
27. Solove & Citron, supra note 1, at 749 (“Although plaintiffs advance a number of theories
of harm, at bottom, their claims are based on three overarching theories . . . .”).
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of their tort and statutory claims too.28 The categories roughly break down as
follows: (1) risk of future injury; (2) the economic value of their personal
data; (3) emotional distress of having their personal data stolen; and (4) the
economic cost of taking precautions to avoid misuse of their information.29
Although there are certainly exceptions, courts generally say that victims
cannot recover any damages for these injuries.30 First, courts largely do not
recognize increased risk of identity theft because it is too speculative.31
Second, courts have said that unaggregated personal information has no
value.32 After all, individuals typically cannot sell their own data. Third, except
in rare circumstances, contract law only recognizes economic damages.33
Therefore, emotional distress is not usually recoverable when companies
break their privacy promises.34 Fourth, courts generally do not compensate
individuals for taking preventative measures to protect against future

28. Id. at 770 (discussing mental distress and “harms of broken trust, betrayal, and disrupted
expectations of secrecy” (quoting Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 147–48
(1992))).
29. Id. at 749–50 (noting the risk of future injury, cost of preventative measures, and
distress); see, e.g., Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909, 912–13 (7th Cir. 2017)
(discussing the concept of the economic value of personal data).
30. See Aaron Wynhausen, Note, The Eighth Circuit Further Complicates Plaintiff Standing in
Data Breach Cases, 84 MO. L. REV. 297, 304 (2019) (“Yet, to date, most data breach class action
cases have been dismissed either due to a plaintiff’s inability to show an injury in fact for purposes
of standing or failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.”); Balasubramani, supra
note 6 (“The overwhelming majority of courts have rebuffed data breach claims brought by
affected persons (particularly those that have been offered monitoring) on the basis that those
individuals have not suffered any appreciable injury.”).
31. See Solove & Citron, supra note 1, at 750–52 (describing various cases rejecting risk of
future harm); see also In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 14-MD-2586
ADM/TNL, 2016 WL 81792, at *4, *8 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2016) (noting “the vast majority of courts
have held that the risk of future identity theft or fraud is too speculative to constitute an injury in
fact for purposes of Article III standing” and dismissing claims for negligence, breach of contract,
and various statutory claims), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017). On appeal
the Eighth Circuit said that the risk of identity theft and credit card theft were too “unlikely” to
support a cause of action. SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 771.
32. See, e.g., Gubala, 846 F.3d at 913 (characterizing plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s
unlawful retention of personal information deprived plaintiff of economic value “gibberish”);
Bass v. Facebook, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“As to the loss of value of
the personal information, plaintiff Adkins has provided no market for the personal information
or the impairment of the ability to participate in that market. This lack of specificity is fatal.”); In
re JetBlue Airways Corp. Priv. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“There is likewise
no support for the proposition that an individual passenger’s personal information has or had
any compensable value in the economy at large.”).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 353 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“Recovery for emotional
disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or the
breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result.”).
34. Solove & Citron, supra note 1, at 753 (noting that courts reject claims of anxiety “nearly
every time”); see, e.g., Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711, 718 (8th Cir. 2017) (“Massive class
action litigation should be based on more than allegations of worry and inconvenience.”).
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injuries.35 Again, that is because such measures protect against speculative,
not past, harm.
Professors Solove and Citron have explored all these problems in detail
and explained that “[t]he difficulty largely stems from the fact that databreach harms are intangible, risk-oriented, and diffuse.”36 Narrow definitions
of harm persist even though consumers view data privacy harms more broadly:
For example, many report they would pay to opt out of biometric data
collection programs because of concerns about future harm.37 Nonetheless,
these enduring limitations make it difficult to raise a breach of contract claim
and demonstrate why contract law has proven to be “largely irrelevant to
information privacy law in the United States.”38
B. TORT LAW
Tort law is also not a good fit for the problems privacy victims have. The
classic privacy torts—(1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) appropriation of name
or likeness; (3) publicity given to private life; and (4) false light—are not wellsuited for addressing the kind of broken promises that companies make in
today’s data driven society.39 These torts require a variety of elements that
routinely do not apply to the loss or misuse of customer data. That may be
because these torts require that the information at issue be “highly offensive”
(cases 1 and 3), that the information be disclosed publicly (cases 3 and 4), or
that the customer’s name or likeness be taken (case 2). In one way or another,
these torts simply do not apply to most modern-day corporate privacy wrongs.
Thus, plaintiffs typically raise two primary kinds of more general tort
claims: misrepresentation (i.e., fraud or negligent misrepresentation) and
negligence. Since reliance is an element of all misrepresentation-based torts,
these privacy claims require that plaintiffs have read and relied on the
misrepresentation.40 But most consumers have understandably not read

35. Solove & Citron, supra note 1, at 753; see, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46
(3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]hey prophylactically spent money to ease fears of future third-party
criminality. Such misuse is only speculative—not imminent. The claim that they incurred
expenses in anticipation of future harm, therefore, is not sufficient to confer standing.”);
SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 771 (“Because plaintiffs have not alleged a substantial risk of future identity
theft, the time they spent protecting themselves against this speculative threat cannot create an
injury.”).
36. Solove & Citron, supra note 1, at 737.
37. Matthew B. Kugler, From Identification to Identity Theft: Public Perceptions of Biometric Privacy
Harms, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 107, 142–43 (2019).
38. Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J.
115, 151 (2017); see also Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law
of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 596 (2014) (“[C]ontract law . . . plays hardly any role in the
protection of information privacy, at least vis-à-vis websites with privacy policies.”).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B–652E (AM. L. INST. 1977) (providing
the elements of each of these torts).
40. See id. §§ 525, 552 (providing the elements of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation).
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privacy policies, let alone relied upon them.41 As a result, courts routinely
dismiss claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.42 Commentators
have also proposed promissory estoppel claims as a potential solution for
privacy victims.43 While promissory estoppel is generally considered part of
contract law, the doctrine actually shares much in common with
misrepresentation torts. Most relevantly, promissory estoppel requires
reliance, and for that reason it does not help privacy plaintiffs either.44
Thus, privacy victims typically resort to general negligence claims. As
discussed in Section II.A, companies’ deficient cybersecurity has allowed
hackers to access billions of individuals’ private information. Moreover,
in many cases, it is not hard to characterize companies’ behavior as
unreasonable or falling below industry standards. Nevertheless, the nature of
the victims’ harm can thwart negligence claims. Here, privacy victims must
contend with the economic loss rule. Although there is some variation on how
the rule operates, at its core, the rule bars a plaintiff from recovering purely
economic losses for negligence claims.45 Since there is rarely physical injury
in privacy cases, when the economic loss rule applies, it can defeat a privacy
victim’s negligence claim.
The rationale underlying the economic loss rule depends on whether it
is being applied to strangers or to contracting parties. In some cases, privacy
victims do not have a contractual relationship with the company that lost their
data. These cases often fit in the so-called “stranger” category of economic loss
cases. For example, Equifax collects credit information about consumers, but
most people affected by the Equifax data breach probably did not have a
contract with Equifax.46 However, in the majority of data breach cases, it’s the
41. Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer M. Urban, Alan Westin’s Privacy Homo Economicus, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 304 (2014) (explaining that it is rational for consumers not to read
privacy policies); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the
Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 168
(2011) (estimating that “the overall average rate of readership of [end user license agreements]
is on the order of 0.1 percent to 1 percent”).
42. See, e.g., Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 855, 865 n.4 (D. Minn. 2015)
(dismissing misrepresentation claims because plaintiff failed to plead that they read and relied
on privacy policy), aff’d on other grounds, 833 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2016); In re iPhone Application
Litig., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (granting summary judgment on
misrepresentation claims because plaintiffs failed to show that they read and relied on Apple’s
privacy policies).
43. Thomas B. Norton, The Non-Contractual Nature of Privacy Policies and a New Critique of the
Notice and Choice Privacy Protection Model, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 181, 208
(2016); Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 IND. L.J. 653, 670 (2019).
44. Norton, supra note 43, at 194–95; see also Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Elec.
Transactions, Inc., No. 09-4567 (RBK/KMW), 2011 WL 900096, at *10 n.10 (D.N.J. Mar. 15,
2011) (holding lack of evidence of reliance precludes promissory estoppel).
45. Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 713,
713 (2006) (“Negligently inflicted economic loss that results from some other kind of injury may
be recoverable, but recovery for stand-alone economic loss is frequently rejected.”).
46. See supra text accompanying note 17 (discussing Equifax data breach).
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company’s customers who lose their data. For the stranger paradigm, the rule
operates to prevent unlimited liability.47 For contracting parties, the idea is
to prod the parties to allocate risks through contract as opposed to imposing
them by law.48 Both of these justifications can potentially affect how the
economic loss rule applies to data breach cases.49 Consequently, there is much
“confusion . . . as to whether and how the economic loss rule should apply” to
these cases.50
Numerous defendants have successfully raised the economic loss rule to
reject negligence causes of action for data breach claims.51 Depending on the
jurisdiction, the rule has important exceptions that privacy victims may be
able to use. Some states have an independent duty exception which permits
negligence claims when the defendant has a duty that does not arise from a
contract.52 Other states have a “special relationship” exception which permits
negligence claims for economic loss when there is a special relationship that
would warrant imposing on the defendant a duty to act with reasonable care
towards the plaintiff.53 The result is that the viability of negligence claims is
jurisdiction dependent.54
But even if privacy plaintiffs can overcome these threshold issues, they
still have to show a cognizable injury. Here, the obstacles look very much like
the ones presented by contract law. The injuries privacy victims suffer are
simply not recognized by the law of negligence.55 As they do for contract
claims, privacy victims that are pursuing tort claims characterize their injuries

47. Catherine M. Sharkey, Can Data Breach Claims Survive the Economic Loss Rule?, 66 DEPAUL
L. REV. 339, 344 (2017) (describing justifications for the economic loss rule).
48. Id. at 344–45.
49. Id. at 345 (noting that the credit card data security cases “often straddle the
stranger/contracting parties paradigms” because of the “complex web of contracts” involved in
the credit card transactions).
50. Id. at 344.
51. See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1176
(D. Minn. 2014) (dismissing data breach negligence claims for five state-law claims based on the
economic loss doctrine but allowing those same claims in the other six states to proceed).
52. See, e.g., In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 362 F. Supp. 3d 1295,
1321 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (applying Georgia law and finding that independent duty exception
applied because companies “that collect sensitive, private data from consumers and store that
data on their networks have a duty to protect that information[.]” (alteration in original)
(quoting Brush v. Mia. Beach Healthcare Grp. Ltd., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1365 (S.D. Fla.
2017))).
53. See, e.g., J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979) (discussing six factors that
determine whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty based on a special relationship).
54. Sharkey, supra note 47, at 342 (“[T]he extent to which the economic loss rule serves as
a formidable barrier to credit card data security breach cases depends upon the underlying state
law . . . .”).
55. Solove & Citron, supra note 1, at 754 (“Even in the face of wrongful conduct by
defendants, courts are denying plaintiffs redress . . . because courts view the harm in overly
narrow ways.”).
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in various ways.56 And like contract law, tort law does not recognize these
harms. When the alleged injuries are the risk of future harm or the expense
of taking precautions, courts say these injuries are too remote or speculative.57
Similarly, lost personal information has no value under tort law. Most privacy
lawsuits are only viable when the victims’ information has actually been
misused.58 The typical examples are identity theft and credit card fraud.59 This
is a very narrow set of claims, too inflexible to accommodate new types of
injuries that technological advances inflict. In sum, traditional common law
claims are not well suited for holding companies accountable for breaking
their privacy promises or having shoddy cybersecurity.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING
For victims of privacy losses, constitutional standing poses yet another
significant challenge. A 2020 study revealed that courts found standing in
only 55 percent of cases that were based on data privacy or data breach
claims.60 When the case was related to a claim for data breach, standing was
found in only 47 percent of the cases.61 Standing has proved to be an obstacle
for all sorts of data protection claims including privacy torts, non-privacy torts,
other common law claims, and even statutory claims.62 Cases denying standing
included federal causes of action as well as state statutory violations, which
were the study’s largest categorical subset of data protection claims submitted
for federal court review.63
Standing is rooted in the Constitution’s case or controversy
requirement.64 The doctrine limits the types of plaintiffs who can seek relief
from the courts. Standing doctrine has evolved to have three primary
requirements: (1) “the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’”;
(2) “there must be a causal connection between the injury and the [alleged
56. See supra text accompanying notes 27–29.
57. Solove & Citron, supra note 1, at 741 n.20, 753 nn.93–94 (listing cases in which future
harm and precautionary expenses were deemed insufficiently injurious).
58. Wynhausen, supra note 30, at 317–18 (noting that, to bring a data breach action in the
Eighth Circuit, “plaintiffs [should] have a credible allegation of identity theft that is somehow
traceable to the data breach” and further concluding that “mere risk of identity theft is not
enough”).
59. Solove & Citron, supra note 1, at 750–51; see, e.g., Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d
359, 366 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Reilly v. Ceridien Corp. and finding no impending injury because
there were no allegations of impersonation and no changes to plaintiffs’ credit information or
bank accounts).
60. See Haley, supra note 9, at 1224; see also Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law,
66 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 439 (2017) (“Article III standing has emerged as a major barrier to
federal court litigation for plaintiffs who assert a violation of their privacy rights.”).
61. Haley, supra note 9, at 1225.
62. Id. at 1225–29.
63. Id. at 1226–27 (reporting that state statutory violations were the most prevalent type of
data-protection claim in the 209 federal court cases analyzed, appearing in 65 percent of cases).
64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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wrongful] conduct,” and; (3) the injury must be likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision.65
Privacy’s standing problem can be traced to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International.66 In Clapper, the plaintiffs sued to
halt the U.S. government’s expansive foreign surveillance program.67 The
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
government’s actions because they could not show that their specific
communications were being intercepted.68 The Clapper plaintiffs’ injuries
were not “certainly impending.”69 Rather, the alleged harms relied on what
the Court called a “speculative chain of possibilities.”70 Moreover, to the
extent that the plaintiffs undertook costly and burdensome precautions to
protect their international communications, the Supreme Court said the
plaintiffs could not “manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on
themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm.”71 The result
was that individuals could not sue unless they learned the government
was intercepting their specific communications. Given that the surveillance
program was secret, this was a daunting obstacle. It was only when Edward
Snowden leaked information about the program that a subsequent group of
plaintiffs had standing to sue the government.72
Clapper has had a powerful influence on standing in data privacy law.
While some courts have recognized standing based on financial outlay and
the increased risk of various concrete privacy harms like identity theft,73 many
decisions continue to rely heavily on Clapper and find that data protection
plaintiffs lack standing.74 In these cases, the reasoning is strikingly similar to

65. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
66. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–18 (2013).
67. Id. at 401–07.
68. Id. at 410.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 410, 414.
71. Id. at 416.
72. The ensuing case was ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015). See Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance”:
Intangible Injury in Fact in the Information Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 762–63 (2016) (discussing
Snowden’s role in the standing issue).
73. See Solove & Citron, supra note 1, at 742 (discussing various cases that “pushed back
against the trend” and found standing); see also Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x
384, 389–90 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding standing where data breach victims suffered an
“identifiable taking” of personal data and a concrete injury in reasonably incurred mitigation
costs (quoting Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 2011))); Remijas v. Neiman
Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding standing because of “an
‘objectively reasonable likelihood’” that hackers would use data breach victims’ stolen credit card
information (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410)).
74. See Haley, supra note 9, at 1220–21 (finding that 49.3 percent of post-Clapper privacy
cases cited Clapper, while 64 percent of plaintiffs in these 103 cases were denied standing).
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that found in Clapper.75 As a threshold matter, courts have found that the mere
loss of data in a cyberattack without evidence that it has been misused is
insufficiently concrete to confer standing.76 To the extent that the plaintiffs
attempt to rely on the substantially increased risks of credit card misuse or
identity theft, courts say that the alleged harms are too remote and rely on a
speculative chain of possibilities. Finally, when the victims point out they paid
for credit monitoring services and took other burdensome preventative
measures, courts have said that plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing” by
taking precautions to avoid an uncertain injury.77
Standing is not just an obstacle for victims of cyberattacks. It can also
present a problem for those seeking to compel companies to comply with
statutory privacy obligations. In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the website Spokeo
published inaccurate information about the plaintiffs.78 The plaintiffs then
brought suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), which “seeks to
ensure ‘fair and accurate credit reporting.’”79 The question presented to the
Supreme Court was whether the plaintiffs’ injuries were sufficiently concrete
to provide them with standing.80 The Supreme Court noted that standing is
not “automatic[]” just because there is a law that “grants a person a statutory
right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.”81
By enacting legislation, “Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate
in law.’”82 But there still must be a concrete harm, and “bare procedural
violation[s]” will not be enough for standing.83 This result can undermine
privacy statutes. For example, Congress has enacted several statutes that place
restrictions on the storage of personal data and give victims a private cause of

75. See id. at 1220–23; Solove & Citron, supra note 1, at 741 (“In decision after decision,
courts have relied on Clapper to dismiss data-breach cases.”).
76. E.g., Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42 (finding that victims whose data was exposed in a cyberattack
had no standing because they “have not suffered any injury; there has been no misuse of the
information, and thus, no harm”); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data
Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 19 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[M]ost [courts] have agreed that the mere
loss of data—without evidence that it has been either viewed or misused—does not constitute an
injury sufficient to confer standing.”).
77. In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 45 F. Supp. 3d at 24 (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416);
see id. at 26; see also Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416 (holding that plaintiffs concerned about unlawful
government surveillance do not have standing based on “certain costs as a reasonable reaction to
a risk of harm” that “is not certainly impending”).
78. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016).
79. Id. at 1545 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (2018)).
80. See id.
81. Id. at 1549.
82. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)).
83. Id. at 1549–50.
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action.84 But for some statutes, courts have denied standing to plaintiffs,
effectively neutering them.85
Commentators have criticized privacy law’s standing doctrine on both
theorical and doctrinal grounds. Solove and Citron have explained how other
areas of the law recognize injuries similar to those suffered by privacy victims
and argue that privacy harms should receive the same treatment.86 Felix Wu
says that standing doctrine has changed in unjustifiable ways.87 While the
doctrine’s original focus was to channel policy questions to the political
branches, the standing doctrine’s current incarnation causes courts to
overreach. Under the modern interpretation, courts are effectively deciding
individuals’ substantive privacy rights.88 This is true even though Congress has
determined that certain privacy breaches deserve a remedy. These decisions
actually flip one of the rationales behind standing on its head. Instead of
keeping the federal courts from meddling in policy, these decisions overrule
the political branches’ policy decisions. Wu calls this “a usurpation of
legislative power.”89
Critics have also argued that when it comes to privacy, the lower courts
are simply misinterpreting Clapper. Seth Kreimer argues that Clapper should
be understood to mean that the “illicit acquisition of personal information is
a cognizable ‘injury in fact’ in and of itself.”90 Finally, because the Supreme
Court itself has suggested that standing is different for private parties

84. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2713 (2018); Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551
(2018); Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2018); Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2018).
85. See Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909, 912–13 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding there was no standing for wrongful retention of data in violation of the Cable
Communications Policy Act when there were no allegations that defendant had disclosed data);
Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016) (same); Hancock v.
Urban Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reasoning that collecting zip codes
in violation of two D.C. statutes did not give rise to a sufficiently concrete injury for standing); see
also Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1046 (2019) (remanding a case in which Google attempted
to settle a case alleging that it violated the Stored Communications Act to determine whether the
plaintiff had a suffered a sufficiently concrete injury to justify standing).
86. Solove & Citron, supra note 1, at 761–64 (describing how the law recognizes
“probabilistic injuries” in several contexts); see also Julie E. Cohen, Information Privacy Litigation as
Bellwether for Institutional Change, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 535, 542–43 (2017) (pointing out that courts
assess the value of information and data in intellectual property contexts). See generally Ryan Calo,
Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 361 (2014) (arguing that harms in privacy law
are not exceptional).
87. See Wu, supra note 60, at 460–61.
88. Id. at 457–58. For example, apparently Congress can no longer enact legislation that
uses a private cause of action to enforce restrictions on the storage of personal data unless the
victims suffer tangible injury as defined by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., supra notes 84–85 and
accompanying text.
89. Wu, supra note 60, at 458.
90. Kreimer, supra note 72, at 765.
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vindicating private rights (as opposed to public rights), several commentators
have argued that courts should not apply Clapper to cases where victims are
asserting that their data was wrongfully lost.91 Indeed, this is the minority
position for which Justice Thomas advocated.92
But despite a large body of criticism, standing still remains a serious
hurdle for privacy victims trying to vindicate their rights. Thomas Haley has
summed up the problem by saying that “[j]udicial reticence to recognize
harm in data-protection litigation contributes to rampant, judicially approved,
consequence-free lawbreaking by businesses, which continue to improperly
collect, store, trade, and lose valuable private information.”93 But it is not just
standing that stymies meritorious privacy claims. As discussed in the
preceding Sections, the law’s conception of privacy injuries generally also
hinders victims’ ability to bring privacy claims. As Solove and Citron put
it: “No matter how derelict defendants might be with regard to security, no
matter how much warning defendants have about prior hacks and breaches,
if plaintiffs cannot show harm, they cannot succeed in their lawsuits.”94
When one also considers whether privacy policies are contracts, whether
victims have read and relied on the broken promises, and the economic loss
rule, it becomes clear that plaintiffs must walk through a veritable gauntlet of
legal obstacles to hold companies accountable for even the most egregious
privacy violations. But this does not mean the law has no answer for privacy
claims. In Part III, this Article explains why the law of restitution and unjust
enrichment can overcome many of the legal hurdles privacy victims’ claims
commonly face.
III. RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Tort, contract, and standing doctrine all have trouble addressing privacy
harms because they are too amorphous. In response, scholars argue that
courts should push at the edges of these doctrines to recognize privacy
harms.95 Such thinking is both logical and desirable.
But this Article offers an alternative front; a different way that others have
generally ignored. The current doctrinal limitations exist because they focus
on the harm plaintiffs suffer. But that is not how the law of restitution and unjust
enrichment operates. This often-misunderstood area of the law focuses on the

91. See Haley, supra note 9, at 1224; Wu, supra note 60, at 446–51, 461.
92. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1552 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[T]he concrete-harm requirement does not apply as rigorously when a private plaintiff seeks to
vindicate his own private rights.”); Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1046–47 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“As I have previously explained, a plaintiff seeking to vindicate a private right need
only allege an invasion of that right to establish standing.”).
93. Haley, supra note 9, at 1197.
94. Solove & Citron, supra note 1, at 739.
95. Id. at 785 (arguing that courts should take the opportunity “to push doctrines in a
progressive direction when it comes to data-beach harms”).
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defendant’s wrongful gain.96 Moreover, it does not require that the broken
privacy promise result in any particular harm like identity theft. Consequently,
restitution can provide victims of privacy breaches a way forward.
To date, most privacy scholars have overlooked restitution. Consider
Solove and Citron’s important article on data breach harms. The authors are
two of the leading experts on privacy law.97 But their article never uses the
term “restitution” and it only mentions “unjust enrichment” as one of the
“tools that can be used to address harm.”98 Even then, the reference is only
found in a single sentence in the article’s conclusion, and there is no citation
to a source or discussion of the claim.99
This is not to say that unjust enrichment and restitution have been totally
overlooked in privacy law. Attorneys raise unjust enrichment in privacy
lawsuits but often as an afterthought following a long list of other causes of
action.100 As a result, court decisions on unjust enrichment often address the
issue perfunctorily.101 Some academics have also said that unjust enrichment
and restitution have a place in privacy law. In an amicus brief filed in Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, a leading group of remedies scholars argued that unjust
enrichment and restitution can provide standing when privacy injuries are
otherwise insufficient.102 Lauren Scholz has built on this work and concluded
that the doctrine can also solve privacy’s “harm problem.”103 While Scholz
focuses on privacy ills caused by companies that do not have a relationship
with the injured party, this Article primarily focuses on holding companies

96. See, e.g., Wright v. Genesee County, 934 N.W.2d 805, 811 (Mich. 2019) (“Unjust
enrichment has evolved from a category of restitutionary claims with components in law and
equity into a unified independent doctrine that serves a unique legal purpose: it corrects for a
benefit received by the defendant rather than compensating for the defendant’s wrongful
behavior.”).
97. Professor Solove is the co-author of several privacy casebooks and a privacy treatise,
founder of the blog TeachPrivacy, and author of numerous privacy articles. Daniel Justin Solove,
GEO. WASH. L., https://www.law.gwu.edu/daniel-justin-solove [https://perma.cc/8PDX-TBLR].
In addition to writing a book, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace, and numerous articles on privacy,
Professor Citron received a MacArthur “Genius Grant” in 2019. Danielle K. Citron, B.U. SCH. L.,
https://www.bu.edu/law/profile/danielle-citron [https://perma.cc/2RAY-V2VK].
98. Solove & Citron, supra note 1, at 785. Other terms one might expect in a discussion of
restitution and unjust enrichment like “disgorgement,” “equity,” “quasi-contract,” and “quantum
meruit” are absent as well.
99. See id.
100. See, e.g., Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(explaining that plaintiffs alleged unjust enrichment as their seventh cause of action, and because
they did not even address the claim in their opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss, “the
[c]ourt deem[ed] this claim abandoned”).
101. See, e.g., In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963, at
*15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (concluding in the last two paragraphs of the decision that there
is no cause of action, with plaintiffs apparently conceding that it is only an equitable remedy).
102. See infra Section III.D.
103. Scholz, supra note 43, at 688.
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accountable when they do have such a relationship.104 But these ideas have
not received much traction.
It should come as no surprise that the law has not thought seriously about
applying restitution and unjust enrichment to privacy harms. “[R]estitutionary
causes of action dropped out of the curriculum of American law schools in
the third quarter of the twentieth century . . . .”105 The result is that practicing
attorneys do not have a good grasp of restitution and unjust enrichment, and
contemporary courts often misapply the doctrine.106 Moreover, because
restitution is deeply intertwined with equity, its scholars tend to be historians
looking at how earlier courts addressed issues of that time.107 In contrast,
scholars who study data privacy and cybersecurity tend to be futurists looking
at how the law should accommodate emerging technology. While both
perspectives are undoubtedly important, it is not surprising that they rarely
converge.
Because restitution is largely unfamiliar to modern American lawyers,
jurists, and scholars, this Section now introduces some terminology.
Unfortunately, even experts disagree about the meaning of some of
restitution’s basic terms.108 Even worse, courts and attorneys regularly confuse
the terminology. According to the Restatement, “[t]he law of restitution is
predominantly the law of unjust enrichment.”109 The term “‘restitution’ is
used to designate both liabilities and remedies in unjust enrichment.”110 “The
substantive part of . . . restitution is concerned with identifying . . . [what is]

104. See id. at 663–81 (discussing restitution and unjust enrichment as applied to third party
“data trafficking”).
105. Douglas Laycock, Restoring Restitution to the Canon, 110 MICH. L. REV. 929, 930 (2012)
[hereinafter Laycock, Restoring Restitution].
106. Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1995) [hereinafter
Kull, Rationalizing Restitution] (“To put it bluntly, American lawyers today (judges and law
professors included) do not know what restitution is.”); Laycock, Restoring Restitution, supra note
105, at 930 (“When a lawyer or judge encounters a restitution problem today, there is a
substantial risk that she will view it as an isolated problem, only dimly aware that there is a large
body of law on restitution and unjust enrichment and that arguments about her particular
problem can be tested and refined in light of larger principles.”).
107. That does not mean all of restitution is equitable. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2011) (“The law of restitution is not
easily characterized as legal or equitable, because it acquired its modern contours as the result of
an explicit amalgamation of rights and remedies drawn from both systems.”).
108. Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 106, at 1191–92 (discussing “[t]he linguistic
confusion that bedevils the law of restitution”).
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (AM. L. INST.
2011). But see Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1279
(1989) [hereinafter Laycock, Scope and Significance] (suggesting that law of restitution
encompasses both unjust enrichment and specific restitution—the latter referring to remedies
that restore something to the plaintiff).
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. e (AM. L. INST.
2011).

A2_CHAO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

574

1/15/2021 4:23 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:555

‘unjust’ for purposes of imposing liability.”111 Even though no express or
implied-in-fact contract exists, some jurisdictions use the terms “implied
contract” or “quasi-contract” to refer to a cause of action based on unjust
enrichment.112
Restitution has a remedial side too. The entire body of restitution
encompasses multiple types of remedies including ejectment, replevin,
rescission, and reformation.113 This Article is focused on just one of
restitution’s remedies: disgorgement. Some cases refer to this remedy as an
“accounting” or “account for profits,” but this Article simply uses the term
“disgorgement.”114 A related remedy is a constructive trust, but unlike a
constructive trust, disgorgement need not identify a particular asset or fund.115
Disgorgement focuses on taking the wrongdoer’s unjust profits or savings and
awarding them to the victim. Although this remedy results in a monetary
award, disgorgement is generally not considered a form of damages. That is
because “damages” refers to a monetary award that compensates the victim
for the harm (i.e., damage) suffered. In short, disgorgement is based on the
defendant’s enrichment while damages focus on the plaintiff’s injury.116
The following Sections discuss how the law of restitution and unjust
enrichment can be applied to privacy losses while avoiding the many doctrinal
pitfalls found in tort, contract, and constitutional standing law.
A. THE DISGORGEMENT REMEDY
The most straightforward application for unjust enrichment for data loss
victims occurs when a company makes money it would not have made but for
the improper use of the victims’ data. This can occur when a company breaks
a promise to keep information private and then sells it or otherwise uses that
information for profit.
The legal analysis differs depending on whether the promise is part of
the company’s contract with their customers or the promise is made outside
of a contract.117 In the former case, unjust enrichment provides a remedy for
a breach of contract. In the latter case, unjust enrichment allows for a distinct

111. Id. § 1 cmt. b.
112. More specifically, “implied-in-law” meaning “invented.” This conception does not create
a valid contract; it leads only to restitution remedies. This is in contrast to implied-in-fact contracts
for which the court finds conduct through which it can imply assent, thus finding a valid contract
and reaching contract remedies. See DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES:
DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION § 4.2, at 390–92 (3d ed. 2018).
113. Id. § 4.2(1), at 389, § 4.3(1), at 398.
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. a (AM. L. INST.
2011).
115. DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 112, § 4.3(1), at 398, § 4.3(2), at 399.
116. See Laycock, Restoring Restitution, supra note 105, at 938.
117. This analysis tracks two of three ways that Laycock says modern restitution matters:
“when unjust enrichment is the only source of liability,” and “when [the] plaintiff prefers to
measure recovery by defendant’s gain.” Laycock, Scope and Significance, supra note 109, at 1284.
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cause of action that is not grounded in contract, tort, or even property law.
Section III.A first explains how victims of data losses can sue companies for
breaking contractual privacy promises and then use unjust enrichment to
obtain a monetary recovery that is based on the company’s unjust enrichment
as opposed to the plaintiff’s own injury. But because not all promises are
found in the contract, Section III.B describes how unjust enrichment can also
serve as an independent cause of action.118
For data breaches covered under a contractual relationship, a restitutionbased disgorgement remedy exists as an alternative to contract law’s traditional
remedies. The primary remedy for breach of contract is expectation
damages.119 In other words, contract law tries to place the successful plaintiff
in the position she would have occupied had the promise been fulfilled (i.e.,
in the absence of a breach). But as discussed earlier, even when a company
violates an express provision in their customer contract, contract law often
fails data loss victims because the doctrine does not recognize the victims’
injuries.
Because unjust enrichment does not focus on the plaintiff’s injury but on
the defendant’s gain, unjust enrichment can step in and provide data loss
victims a viable remedy.120 Chapter 4 of the Restatement is entitled “Restitution
and Contract” and sections 37–39 deal explicitly with alternative remedies
for breach of contract.121 Importantly, section 39 entitled “Profit from
Opportunistic Breach” allows the plaintiff to recover money based on the
defendant’s wrongful profits. Section 39(1) provides:
If a deliberate breach of contract results in profit to the defaulting
promisor and the available damage remedy affords inadequate
protection to the promisee’s contractual entitlement, the promisee
has a claim to restitution of the profit realized by the promisor as a
result of the breach. Restitution by the rule of this section is an
alternative to a remedy in damages.122

118. Unjust enrichment can also serve as a remedy for other common law doctrines, and
even for statutory violations, making it a suitable remedy for privacy violations that do not just
involve broken promises. DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 112, § 4.1(1), at 370 (“Restitution
remedies may flow from a freestanding cause of action based on unjust enrichment or may
piggyback on other causes of action such as contracts, torts, fiduciary duties, and intellectual
property.”).
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 347 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 1981).
120. See Laycock, Scope and Significance, supra note 109, at 1285–86 (explaining how
restitution can serve as a remedy for substantive causes of action like torts and breaches of
contract).
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 37–39 (AM. L. INST.
2011).
122. Id. § 39(1).

A2_CHAO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

576

1/15/2021 4:23 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:555

This type of remedy is disgorgement.123 The comments to section 39
explain the underlying purpose for the recovery of profits “is the
reinforcement of an entitlement that would be inadequately protected if
liability for interference were limited to provable damages.”124 Privacy loss
victims are ideal candidates for using section 39. The Restatement uses the
term “inadequate” to suggest that damages are smaller than they should be to
effectuate the purpose of the contract. That certainly applies to privacy loss
victims. Their remedies are not merely inadequate; they are nonexistent.
Without a stronger alternative remedy, businesses would have no incentive to
abide by the privacy promises they make in their customer contracts.125
While it is fair to call section 39 a “new rule,” there is precedent
supporting the rule.126 A number of courts had previously awarded a
disgorgement remedy for intentional breach when typical contract damages
would leave the plaintiff inadequately protected.127 For example, in May v.
Muroff, the seller of land improperly sold fill from the land before the
transaction closed.128 The trial court awarded $122,067 in expectation
damages, the difference between the value of the land as promised and as
delivered.129 But the Florida District Court of Appeal revised the award and
ordered disgorgement of the proceeds of sale of the fill, $240,000.130 The
court first noted that the breach was “deliberate” and justified the remedy by
explaining that the seller “should not be permitted to profit by his own wrong

123. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REV. 559,
560–61 (2006) [hereinafter Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest] (explaining that “the
disgorgement interest . . . is the promissee’s interest in requiring the promisor to disgorge a gain
that was made possible by her breach, but did not consist of a benefit conferred on her by the
promisee”); Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement for Opportunistic Breach of Contract and
Mitigation of Damages, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 131, 134 (2008) [hereinafter Roberts, Opportunistic
Breach] (describing disgorgement as “strip[ping] the defendant’s gain”).
124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. b (AM. L. INST.
2011).
125. Punitive damages would offer an even stronger disincentive. See William S. Dodge, The
Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 633 (1999) (arguing for punitive damages
in cases of willful and opportunistic breach).
126. Roberts, Opportunistic Breach, supra note 123, at 140 (saying that section 39 “is an
‘essentially new’ rule, although not without precedent” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT, reporter’s introductory memorandum, at xv (AM. L. INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005))). But see Roy Ryden Anderson, The Compensatory Disgorgement
Alternative to Restatement Third’s New Remedy for Breach of Contract, 68 SMU L. REV. 953, 962 (2015)
(pointing out that disgorgement as remedy for breach of contract is not found in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts).
127. Marco J. Jimenez, Retribution in Contract Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 637, 718–22 (2018)
(discussing cases prior to the Restatement that provided a disgorgement remedy for opportunistic
breach); see also DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 112, § 4.4(2), at 449 & n.392 (describing more
recent cases that allow for disgorgement upon intentional breach of contract).
128. May v. Muroff, 483 So. 2d 772, 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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and enjoy a windfall profit.”131 Thus, the disgorgement remedy allowed the
plaintiff to recover more than his expectation damages. This outcome is
necessary in disgorgement cases to effectuate the intent of the parties. It is
particularly appropriate where the plaintiff would have been able to seek and
receive equitable relief such as an injunction or specific performance if only
the plaintiff had possessed advance notice of the breach.
Admittedly, the idea of awarding a monetary recovery that exceeds the
value of the plaintiff’s injury seems antithetical to conventional contract
law.132 One of the core principles of contract remedies is that it is not punitive
except when the breach is also a tort.133 Any damages are simply intended to
place the party in the position it expected to be in had there been performance.
But the point of providing a disgorgement remedy for intentional breach is
entirely consistent with the more fundamental contract law goal of
effectuating the parties’ intent. If the conventional contract remedy (i.e.,
expectation damages) fails to provide an adequate incentive for a party to
comply with its promises, restitution needs to step in and provide an
alternative remedy that will incentivize the party to comply with its promises.
Further, disgorgement is not punitive or at least not disproportionately so.134
It only strips that portion of the gain that is wrongful in order to undo the
unjust enrichment and deter further opportunism.
Importantly, the term “deliberate” in section 39 has been interpreted to
apply to conduct beyond purely intentional breaches.135 In Kansas v. Nebraska,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that deliberate breach also occurs when a party

131. Id. (citing Laurin v. DeCarolis Constr. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675 (Mass. 1977)). In Laurin,
the seller sold loam, gravel, trees, and shrubs from the property prior to closing. Laurin, 363
N.E.2d at 676. Like the court in May, the Massachusetts Supreme Court awarded the plaintiff the
value of the sold items, saying, “where the defendant’s breach is deliberate and wilful, we think
damages limited to diminution in value of the premises may sometimes be seriously inadequate.”
Id. at 678; see also Watson v. Cal-Three, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189, 1195–97 (Colo. App. 2011) (“If the
breaching party’s wrongdoing is intentional or substantial, or there are no other means of
measuring the wrongdoer’s enrichment, recovery of the breaching party’s profits may be
granted.”).
132. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. a (AM. L.
INST. 2011) (“Judged by the usual presumptions of contract law, a recovery for breach that
exceeds the plaintiff’s provable damages is anomalous on its face.”).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 355 (AM. L. INST. 1981); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 760 (4th ed. 2004) (“No matter how reprehensible the breach, damages
are generally limited to those required to compensate the injured party for lost expectation
. . . .”). But see Jimenez, supra note 127, at 662–714 (arguing that courts already take into count
“retributive considerations” as they apply a variety of different contract doctrines).
134. See Mark P. Gergen, Causation in Disgorgement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 827, 830 (2012) (arguing
that courts often “fudge” the causal analysis in disgorgement to arrive at amounts that serve to
deter wrongdoing).
135. See Anderson, supra note 126, at 979–80 (criticizing the use of the term “deliberate” in
section 39 as confusing, and suggesting that the term was meant “to describe a breach designed
to further the self-interest of the breaching party at the other party’s expense”).
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exposes the other side to a known risk of breach.136 In the underlying dispute,
Kansas had filed suit in the U.S. Supreme Court alleging Nebraska had
violated a prior settlement agreement, and taken more than its proper share
of water from the Republican River.137 The Supreme Court appointed a
special master who found Nebraska in breach and “award[ed] Kansas $3.7
million for its loss, and another $1.8 million in partial disgorgement of
Nebraska’s still greater gains.”138
Because the special master’s ruling found that Nebraska officials did
not “deliberately set out to violate the [settlement],”139 Nebraska argued
disgorgement was not warranted under section 39(1) of the Restatement.140 In
an opinion by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court took an expansive view of
the meaning of “deliberate” saying that in some contexts, “the distinction
between purposefully invading and recklessly disregarding another’s rights
makes no difference.”141 Since the special master found Nebraska “‘knowingly
exposed Kansas to a substantial risk’ of breach, and blithely proceeded,”
disgorgement was called for in this case.142 The Court justified its decision by
saying that it “may order disgorgement of gains, if needed to stabilize a
compact and deter future breaches, when a State has demonstrated reckless
disregard of another, more vulnerable State’s rights under that instrument.”143
Kansas v. Nebraska only says what the federal common law is. While there
is no general federal common law, federal common law controls certain
specialized disputes such as those between co-equal states where neither
state’s law can govern.144 In applying common law contract principles and
the disgorgement remedy in Kansas v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court created
federal common law that is informative but not binding for state courts.
Consequently, the various state courts will have to decide whether they are
also willing to consider reckless breach to justify disgorgement. Justice
Thomas concurring in part and dissenting in part (joined by Justices Scalia
and Alito) provides the counterpoint.145 The dissent first challenged the very

136. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1055–56 (2015).
137. Id. at 1048–49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 gives the United States original jurisdiction over
suits between states.
138. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1051.
139. Id. at 1056 (quoting Brief for Nebraska at 16, Kansas, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (No. 126)).
140. Id.
141. Id.; see also Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 756, 767–70 (2011)
(finding that willful blindness can satisfy the knowledge requirement in a civil lawsuit for patent
infringement by an 8–1 margin).
142. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1046 (quoting Report of Special Master at 130, Kansas, 135 S. Ct.
1042 (No. 126)).
143. Id. at 1057.
144. See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
145. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1064–74 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Chief Justice Roberts joined as to Part III of Justice Thomas’ opinion which was concurring in
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idea of disgorgement, saying that the Supreme Court “has never before relied
on [section] 39 nor adopted its proposed theory of disgorgement. . . . The
sheer novelty of this proposed remedy counsels against applying it here.”146
But even accepting section 39, the dissent pointed out that disgorgement was
only available “in cases of deliberate breach.”147 Moreover, Justice Thomas
resisted “fashioning a new remedy of disgorgement for reckless breach” saying
that “[d]isgorgement is strong medicine,” and should be used “only
sparingly.”148 Both the majority and minority’s views of disgorgement in
Kansas v. Nebraska will undoubtedly be influential as states decide whether
section 39 is consistent with their views on unjust enrichment.
This Article sides with the majority view, in part because it is the only
way to provide an entire category of deserving plaintiffs with a remedy. While
Kansas v. Nebraska appears to break new ground, applying disgorgement
to reckless breach is entirely consistent with the purposes underlying the
Restatement. Section 39 is titled “Profit from Opportunistic Breach,” and that
term is intended to capture the situation where the breaching party can
ignore her contractual obligation because the conventional remedy is
inadequate.149 In so doing, the breaching party can obtain more than
what she bargained for. That rationale makes equal sense for intentional
breaches or reckless breaches. If conventional contract remedies are deemed
inadequate to protect against intentional breaches, those same remedies are
also inadequate to deter companies from recklessly ignoring their contractual
obligations.
Whether disgorgement can apply in cases of “reckless breach of contract”
is particularly important in the data security context. When customers lose
their data in cyberattacks, most companies will be able to say they did not
intentionally breach promises to provide reasonable data security. But these
victims will often be able to show that particular companies recklessly broke
these promises. If the state courts follow Kansas v. Nebraska, these companies
will have to take their data security promises more seriously.
Importantly, the concept of awarding damages that exceed the plaintiff’s
injuries is generally inconsistent with the idea of “efficient breach.”150 This
part and dissenting part, but not Part II which dealt with the disgorgement analysis. Id. at 1064
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id. at 1068–69 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. Id. at 1069.
148. Id. at 1069–70 (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. b (AM. L. INST.
2011) (“The common rationale of every instance in which restitution allows a recovery of profits
from wrongdoing, in the contractual context or any other, is the reinforcement of an entitlement
that would be inadequately protected if liability for interference were limited to provable
damages.”).
150. Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement as a Moral Compass for Breach of Contract, 77
U. CIN. L. REV. 991, 1009 (2009).

A2_CHAO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

580

1/15/2021 4:23 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:555

theory suggests breach may sometimes be desirable in cases where the
promisor’s gain from the breach exceeds the promisee’s loss.151 However, if
the promisor must disgorge her profits upon a breach, there would be no
incentive to breach regardless of how efficient it might be. The Restatement
recognized this tension and expressly rejected the idea of efficient breach.152
The Restatement’s justifications align with some of the prominent critiques
of efficient breach. These critiques are grounded in both efficiency and the
general concept of good faith. To start, efficient breach incorrectly assumes:
(1) that a promisee is “indifferent between performance and damages,” and
(2) that “the promisor knows the value” of performance to the promisee.153
These issues are particularly salient for victims of data losses. First, since these
victims often cannot recover any damages, they are not indifferent between
performance and damages. They undoubtedly prefer performance. Second,
since the companies are unlikely to have to pay any compensatory damages
for their breach, companies may view the value of performance to the
promisee as zero. This would be true even in cases where customers care
deeply about keeping their data private. Thus, efficient breach would suggest
that companies should breach their privacy promises whenever they can
derive any non-zero value from their customers’ data. But the law should
not allow companies to ignore their privacy promises in this way. This is
precisely the kind of situation the law of unjust enrichment governs. By
forcing companies to disgorge any resulting profits, section 39 provides real
disincentives to breaking privacy promises.
But even if we assume that a particular breach could make the promisor
better off without harming the promisee, the Restatement favors a negotiated
release.154 This approach is arguably more efficient, fair, and consistent with
notions of good faith. It is more efficient because a negotiated release will
take into account a “richer mix of information.”155 This is because any

151. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.10, at 129 (9th ed. 2014).
Although Posner is well known for advocating efficient breach, he does not apply that theory to
opportunistic breach. There he says, “[w]e can deter A’s opportunistic behavior by making it
worthless to him, which can be done by making him hand over all his profits from the breach to
the promisee. No lighter sanction would deter.” Id.
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. h (AM. L. INST.
2011) (“The rationale of the disgorgement liability in restitution, in a contractual context or any
other, is inherently at odds with the idea of efficient breach in its usual connotation.”).
153. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach,
and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 998 (2005) [hereinafter
Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance]; id. at 999–1003; see also Andrew Kull,
Disgorgement for Breach, the “Restitution Interest,” and the Restatement of Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021,
2051 (2001) [hereinafter Kull, Disgorgement for Breach] (pointing out that efficient breach ignores
litigation costs).
154. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. h (AM. L.
INST. 2011) (“A voluntary transaction in the present context requires a negotiated release or
modification of the existing obligation.”).
155. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, supra note 153, at 1001.
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negotiation is more likely to account for how both parties value performance.
A negotiated release is also fairer because the parties could split any
surplus. Finally, a negotiated release is more consistent with notions of good
faith because it does not reward intentional breaches.156 By allowing for
disgorgement of a breaching party’s profits, the Restatement is clearly siding
against the idea of efficient breach.157
The Restatement’s view on negotiated release should be less controversial
in privacy law than in other contexts. In privacy law, the FTC already views
the failure to disclose changes to a privacy policy as an unfair trade practice.158
It has brought enforcement actions against companies that have tried to
retroactively change their privacy policies.159 Thus, at least with respect to
privacy law, the Restatement simply requires the same standards of conduct
already imposed by the FTC and other state unfair trade practice statutes.
One potential advantage of the disgorgement remedy is that it may be
more palatable to critics of class actions lawsuits. One common argument
is that class action damage awards are disproportionate to the underlying
wrongdoing.160 However, by only taking the defendant’s wrongful gains (or
savings), the disgorgement remedy simply places the defendant in the same
state it would have occupied had it not committed the offense. Companies
also have the ability to seek offsets to disgorgement awards based upon gains
that are not attributable to the wrong (in other words, independently earned
by the companies’ efforts without use of consumers’ data).161 In contrast,
punitive damages typically make the defendant worse off. The same is often
true for statutory damages which are not based on either the defendant’s gain

156. See Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, supra note 153, at 2051 (describing efficient breach as
“a conscious decision to give the plaintiff less than what was promised”).
157. Id. at 2050 (“The law of unjust enrichment condemns [efficient breach] and seeks to
frustrate it by imposing a remedy—disgorgement of profits—that forecloses any possibility that
the defendant could respond in damages to the plaintiff and still come out ahead.”).
158. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 38, at 640 (“According to the FTC, it is unfair to change
the terms that govern personal information that was collected under a previous, different
agreement.”).
159. In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 449 (2004) (“Respondent’s retroactive
application of its revised privacy policy . . . . was, and is, an unfair act or practice.”); Complaint at
9, In re Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365, 2012 WL 3518628, at *6 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012) (alleging that
the retroactive change of a material privacy promise constituted an unfair act or practice).
160. See Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 368 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (“[F]or a court to
require companies to pay damages to thousands of customers, when there is yet to be a single
case of identity theft proven, strikes us as overzealous and unduly burdensome to businesses.”);
Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages and Class Actions,
74 MO. L. REV. 103, 115 (2009) (discussing the problem of excessive statutory damages in class
action suits).
161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (AM. L. INST.
2011).
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or the plaintiff’s actual loss.162 Of course, given that most privacy wrongs will
likely go undetected, disgorgement may not serve as a complete deterrent.163
Still, it will provide some measure of compensation to privacy victims. In short,
disgorgement occupies a middle ground.164 It provides a larger award and a
more secure route than more commonly used claims, although it certainly
provides less of a stick than punitive or statutory damages.
1. Privacy Promises “Unrelated to Profit”
Even though privacy loss victims appear to fit squarely within section 39,
judges may be reluctant to allow a disgorgement remedy because of their
unfamiliarity with both restitution law and privacy harms. Accordingly, the
next two Sections illustrate how different kinds of privacy losses fit squarely
within the classic disgorgement cases.
Melvin Eisenberg has cataloged the various types of cases in which
disgorgement should be used.165 He labels one of these categories, “Bargains
Designed to Serve Interests Other Than Profit-making.”166 For privacy victims
whose data have been sold or used in breach of a privacy promise, these cases
can serve as a model for asking courts to disgorge a company’s unjust profits.
For contracts that include promises made for reasons other than profit,
expectation damages are often inadequate because the primary purpose
of the promise is unrelated to money. Thus, expectation damages will not
provide the promisee with what she actually contracted for. Moreover, for
some situations, the law will not be able to place a value on the expectation
interest. Thus, the “best and perhaps only way” to effectively police these
promises is through disgorgement.167
An important example of this kind of bargain is found in the well-known
case of Snepp v. United States.168 As an employee of the Central Intelligence
Agency (“CIA”), Snepp had signed an employment agreement promising he
would not publish any information or material relating to his employment

162. See Parker v. Time Warner Ent. Co., 331 F.3d 13, 21–22 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that
statutory damages in class actions can cause the potential liability to be grossly disproportionate
to the actual harm from the violation).
163. See William T. Allen, Commentary on the Limits of Compensation and Deterrence in Legal
Remedies, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 67, 72 (explaining why a compensationbased remedy will under-deter wrongs when there are undetected violations).
164. See DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 542 (9th
ed. 2018); Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property
or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 552 (1980) (describing disgorgement as less
harsh than punitive damages); see also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1980) (per
curiam) (preferring the disgorgement remedy over exemplary damages because it deals fairly
with both parties).
165. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest, supra note 123, at 581–97.
166. Id. at 588.
167. Id. at 591.
168. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507.
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without specific prior approval.169 He breached the agreement by publishing
a book about the CIA’s activities during the end of the Vietnam War without
prior approval.170 However, the book contained no classified information.171
The Supreme Court was asked to decide the appropriateness of the
remedy.172 Clearly, the purpose of the clearance requirement was about
national security, not profit.173 The injury had nothing to do with how much
money the government expected. The government had no financial interest
in the book. Rather, the undisputed testimony was that the breach “seriously
impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations.”174 The
Supreme Court noted that “actual damages . . . are unquantifiable.”175 The
only way to protect the CIA’s interest was to punish Snepp or somehow take
away incentives for future breaches. The Court rejected the first tactic, saying
punitive damages were both “speculative and unusual.”176 Instead, the
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision to impose a constructive
trust on Snepp’s profit.177 The Court believed that this remedy dealt “fairly
with both parties” saying that the remedy simply required Snepp “to disgorge
the benefits of his faithlessness.”178 At the same time, the Court noted that the
remedy avoided punitive damages that may be disproportionate to Snepp’s
gain.179
Contracts that include promises to keep information private have clear
parallels to the contract in Snepp. Like the U.S. government in Snepp,
consumers do not expect that promises to keep their information private will
benefit them financially. Rather, these individuals are simply asked to be
left alone. Conventional contract remedies are inadequate to protect these
privacy promises because courts refuse to recognize the loss of personal
information as a compensable injury. Finally, specific performance is unhelpful
because the contract has been breached and there is no way to put the
proverbial cat back in the bag. Accordingly, the best and perhaps only way to
incentivize companies to respect privacy promises is to insist that they

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 507–08.
Id.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 507.
See id. at 514–16.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 514.
Id. The general rule is that punitive damages cannot be awarded in contract cases.
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & RICHARD L. HASEN, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS
260 (5th ed. 2019).
177. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515–16; see also Att’y Gen. v. Blake [2000] UKHL 45, [2001] 1 AC
(HL) 268 (appeal taken from Eng.) (using similar analysis, the House of Lords in England also
awarded disgorgement when their own former intelligence operative published a book without
clearance).
178. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515.
179. Id. at 515–16.
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disgorge their profits if they impermissibly sell or otherwise profit from the
data.
2. Data Security Promises as “Skimped Services”
For privacy victims who have lost their personal data because a company
failed to take reasonable data security measures, another category of cases
called “skimped services” can serve as a model for asking for a company’s
unjust savings. In these cases, the unjust savings would be the money the
company should have spent if it had actually delivered on its promise of
adequate cybersecurity. Commentators generally agree that disgorgement is
appropriate where the wrong is based on a skimped service.180 In these cases,
the contract typically requires the promisor to provide a specific service or
good. The promisor either fails to perform entirely or underperforms.
Andrew Kull, the Reporter for the Restatement, has cataloged the
paradigmatic skimped service cases.181 A shortened list includes: the mining
company that failed to restore the land after extracting coal;182 the firefighting
company that failed to keep the required number of firemen ready;183 and
Coca-Cola, which substituted high fructose corn syrup for cane sugar.184
In each case, expectation damages would have resulted in either under
compensation or no compensation. For the landowner, the diminution in
value of the unrestored land after mining was minimal.185 The City of New
Orleans was undamaged because the smaller number of firefighters were able
to adequately handle the fires during the term of the contract.186 For the
bottlers who sued Coca-Cola, the customers apparently did not care if cane
sugar or corn syrup was used.187 So there were no actual damages. However,
the breach in each of these cases can be labelled as opportunistic, and the
defendants were all unjustly enriched. Under section 39 of the Restatement,
disgorgement would apply in all of these situations.

180. See Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest, supra note 123, at 592–93 (explaining why
disgorgement is appropriate in “skimped-services cases”); Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, supra note
153, at 2047; E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle
in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1384–86 (1985) (describing why disgorgement is
appropriate where there has been an “abuse of contract”).
181. Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, supra note 153, at 2047.
182. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 111 (Okla. 1962).
183. City of New Orleans v. Firemen’s Charitable Ass’n, 9 So. 486, 487 (La. 1891) (finding
the contract required the defendant to employ 124 firefighters, but it retained no more than 70).
184. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 988 F.2d 386, 409 (3d
Cir. 1993).
185. Moreover, the plaintiffs were not permitted to recover the cost of performance because
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma viewed that remedy as “grossly disproportionate” to the
economic value of that work. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 114.
186. City of New Orleans, 9 So. at 488.
187. Coca-Cola, 988 F.2d at 408.
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The justification for applying disgorgement to skimped service cases
is that the rule would make it more likely parties would abide by their
contractual promises. The problem in cases of skimped services is that
“[e]xpectation damages give the promisor insufficient incentives to
perform.”188 Providing a disgorgement remedy serves “to deter a form of
conscious wrongdoing that encounters no adequate disincentive.”189 Allan
Farnsworth, a Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, has one of the
narrower views of disgorgement in contract cases, but even he suggests that
disgorgement is appropriate when the plaintiff has no other adequate
remedy.190
Notably, the skimped services cases illustrate how disgorgement is not
limited to the recovery of profits earned, but also “savings made.” In these
cases, disgorgement awards the difference between how much money the
defendant actually spent and the amount it should have spent if it had not
“skimped” on its promise. That is the amount of money the fire department
saved by providing fewer firefighters. This is fully consistent with how the
Restatement views disgorgement. Section 39 states that “[p]rofits from breach
include saved expenditure.”191 This type of recovery is important for victims
who lost their data from third party cyberattacks. Unlike cases where victims’
data was taken by the company and impermissibly sold or used, here there are
no profits to disgorge. Victims of data breaches will have to seek savings that
represent the difference between the money the company actually spent on
data security and the amount the company should have spent.
Of course, all the justifications for using disgorgement in skimped
services cases apply with equal force to companies that promise reasonable
data security and then fail to deliver. In the typical data breach case, personal
information from millions of customers has been taken. There is undoubtedly
real injury. The courts simply refuse to place a dollar value on that injury.
Disgorgement may make even more sense in data breach cases than in many
other skimped service cases that at least provide the aggrieved party with some
damages. Absent disgorgement, victims of data loss often would continue to
receive nothing.
For some courts and policymakers, applying disgorgement to inadequate
cybersecurity may swing the balance of power too far in favor of customers.
That is because disgorgement does not only apply when damages are hard to

188. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest, supra note 123, at 593.
189. Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, supra note 153, at 2049.
190. Farnsworth would limit disgorgement in contract law to those situations to what he calls
an “abuse of contract.” The following example illustrates the concept: “If I realize a gain as a
result of my breach of contract, there has been an abuse of that contract if you, the injured party,
are left with a defective performance and no opportunity to use your return performance to
attempt to obtain a substitute.” Farnsworth, supra note 180, at 1384.
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39(3) (AM. L. INST.
2011).
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measure; it even applies in the absence of any injury.192 For data security cases,
that means disgorgement can come into play even if there has not been
a successful cyberattack. In other words, the predicate for the unjust
enrichment claim is not losing customer data, it is unjustly skimping on data
security services. While suits that do not involve successful cyberattacks are
theoretically possible, in practice, they are unlikely to occur. That is because
customers typically learn about company’s poor data security practices only
after a breach has occurred.
A critique of my argument is that the common law support for applying
disgorgement to skimped service cases is not nearly as settled as the
theoretical support. For many of the paradigmatic cases, the defendants were
not actually required to disgorge their gains.193 That may be because neither
the plaintiffs nor the court considered the remedy, as appears to be the case
in Peevyhouse.194 Or it might be because the plaintiffs abandoned the unjust
enrichment theory after trial as happened in the dispute over the sweetener
in Coca-Cola.195 Moreover, in New Orleans v. Firemen’s Charitable Association, the
court rejected the city’s attempt to get any damages because there was no
actual injury.196 But these critiques are directed to section 39 of the Restatement
as a whole. If a jurisdiction accepts section 39, the idea of applying
disgorgement to broken privacy promises should be uncontroversial.
One might also question whether courts are really equipped to
determine whether companies have broken their cybersecurity promises and
failed to provide “adequate” or “reasonable” data security. William McGeveran
has already done much of the work here. He describes “fourteen different
‘frameworks’ that impose data security obligations on private companies” and
shows how they are “converging on a common set of standards.”197 In short,
the United States has already developed a common understanding of which
practices do or do not constitute reasonable data security. Courts should be
192. See supra text accompanying notes 186–87 (discussing how in both the cases of hiring
fewer firefighters than contracted and substituting corn syrup for cane sugar, there were no
allegations of actual injury).
193. Anderson, supra note 126, at 996 (pointing out that many of the skimped service cases
underlying various Restatement examples did not actually apply a disgorgement remedy, and
arguing that contract law can provide an adequate remedy by taking approaches that are not
based purely on expectancy damages).
194. The decision does not mention restitution, unjust enrichment, or disgorgement, but
Farnsworth and Judith Maute separately explain how the court could have used disgorgement to
prevent Garland Coal from being unjustly enriched by its breach. Farnsworth, supra note 180, at
1384–89; Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of Willie
and Lucille, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1341, 1442–43 (1995).
195. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 988 F.2d 386, 408–09
(3d Cir. 1993).
196. City of New Orleans v. Firemen’s Charitable Ass’n, 9 So. 486, 488 (La. 1891) (denying
New Orleans any recovery because there were no allegations of “any damage suffered by the city
in consequence of any violation of the contract”).
197. William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1139 (2019).
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able to apply these standards to determine whether companies are violating
them. After all, judges and juries are regularly asked to apply reasonableness
standards in a variety of other contexts, most notably for negligence torts.198
Those cases often involve complex technical issues like whether a particular
safety precaution is reasonable. Yet, the law does not hesitate to ask our
judicial system to make these decisions. The law should treat decisions on data
security similarly.199
Finally, I should note that a few courts have allowed privacy victims to
proceed on a claim of unjust enrichment (as a cause of action).200 For
example, in Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., two laptops were stolen from the offices of
AvMed, a health care service provider.201 “The unencrypted laptops contained
the sensitive information of approximately 1.2 million current and former
AvMed members.”202 The Eleventh Circuit denied the defendant’s motion to
dismiss and allowed the plaintiffs to attempt to recover a portion of their
monthly premiums on a theory of unjust enrichment.203 Beyond demonstrating
that privacy claims do not have to base their demands on the victims’ injuries,
Resnick also demonstrates how unjust enrichment does not suffer the
causation problems that plague other causes of action. The Eleventh Circuit
specifically noted that “[p]laintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim does not have a
causation element.”204 Thus, plaintiffs would not have to show the thieves used
the information on the laptops to harm the victims. To be clear, unjust
enrichment does not receive much attention in any of these cases. The claims
tend to be alleged as one of the later causes of action in the complaints, and
judicial decisions do not spend much time on these claims. But because unjust
enrichment does not suffer from many of the doctrinal problems of
traditional claims, privacy victims may wish to privilege these claims.
B. MISUNDERSTANDING CONTRACTUAL PREEMPTION
Modern courts often do not understand the relationship between unjust
enrichment and contract law. Unfortunately, this misunderstanding can

198. Id. at 1196 (discussing reasonableness standards as “among the oldest cornerstones of law”).
199. This Article does not take a position on whether disgorgement is an issue for the judge
or jury, an issue that “remains unresolved in American law.” Caprice L. Roberts, Disgorging
Emoluments, 103 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 25 (2019) [hereinafter Roberts, Disgorging Emoluments]
(providing a discussion of the law–equity classification).
200. See In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., 402 F. Supp. 3d 767, 803
(N.D. Cal. 2019) (“[E]ven if the plaintiffs suffered no economic loss from the disclosure of their
information, they may proceed at this stage on a claim for unjust enrichment to recover the gains
that Facebook realized from its allegedly improper conduct.”); Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F.
Supp. 3d 654, 678 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (denying motion to dismiss unjust enrichment claim), aff’d,
739 F. App’x 91 (3d Cir. 2018).
201. Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1328.
204. Id.
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frustrate data loss victims’ ability to bring unjust enrichment claims. Some
courts mistakenly believe that a claim for unjust enrichment is preempted by
the mere existence of a contract that touches upon the subject matter in
dispute. Just rereading the decisions discussed earlier in this Article shows
unjust enrichment can be found between contracting parties.205 Thus, the
view that unjust enrichment is incompatible with the existence of a contract
cannot be accurate.
It is not the “existence” of a contract that eliminates the right to unjust
enrichment; that right is only supplanted when the parties decide that they
do not want their relationship governed by unjust enrichment and express
that decision in their contract. In other words, the availability of unjust
enrichment is no different than many other default rules.206 The default rule
applies unless the parties have bargained around it.207 For example, parties
can agree to forgo their right to go to court, and instead resolve their disputes
through binding arbitration. They can disclaim warranties, and they can limit
consequential damages. Unjust enrichment is no different. Contracts can
affirm, modify, or disclaim the rights and remedies that unjust enrichment
would normally provide.208
Nevertheless, many courts remain confused about the relationship
between contracts and unjust enrichment. For example, in TruGreen Cos. v.
Mower Bros., the Utah Supreme Court said that restitution is limited to cases
where “no express contract is present.”209 Courts from other jurisdictions have
used similar language.210 In New York, one decision stated, “[t]he existence
of an express agreement . . . governing a particular subject matter precludes

205. This Article has already discussed many cases that applied unjust enrichment when the
parties had a contract. See, e.g., supra Section III.A (discussing May v. Muroff, Kansas v. Nebraska
(the states had entered into a “compact” which is essentially a contract), and Snepp v. United
States).
206. By describing unjust enrichment as a default rule, I do not mean to suggest that it is the
preferred remedy for breach of contract. Rather, I use the term “default rule” to suggest that
unjust enrichment is generally available as an alternative remedy when circumstances call for it.
207. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (“Default rules fill the gaps in incomplete contracts; they
govern unless the parties contract around them.”).
208. Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment says that, “[a] valid
contract defines the obligations of the parties as to matters within its scope, displacing to that
extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 2(2) (AM. L. INST. 2011).
209. TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros., 199 P.3d 929, 933 (Utah 2008) (referring to unjust
enrichment as restitution).
210. See, e.g., Ovation Toys Co. v. Only Hearts Club, No. 2:14-cv-01711-R, 2015 WL
13439771, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015) (“Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment fails as a matter
of law because it is not a recognized cause of action in California, particularly when a plaintiff
alleges an express contract.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 675 F. App’x 721 (9th Cir.
2017); Doss v. Homecomings Fin. Network, Inc., 210 S.W.3d 706, 709 n.4 (Tex. App. 2006)
(applying unjust enrichment “to disputes where there is no actual contract”).
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recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter.”211
The Restatement criticized these sweeping statements, saying, “[j]udicial
statements to the effect that ‘there can be no unjust enrichment in contract
cases’ can be misleading if taken casually.”212 But this view persists in several
jurisdictions and can thwart the ability of data loss victims to request
disgorgement.
Consider In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litigation, which concerned a
cyberattack on a health insurance company’s database.213 The hackers
obtained personal information on as many as 80 million Anthem customers
and employees.214 The information included names, Social Security numbers,
birthdays, home addresses, email addresses, and employment information.215
Anthem had several privacy policies that made various representations about
the data security precautions the company took.216 The plaintiffs alleged
Anthem broke these promises and asserted breach of contract and unjust
enrichment as well as other causes of action.217 The court rejected the breach
of contract claims, saying the plaintiffs failed to show the privacy policies were
part of the plaintiffs’ contract with Anthem.218 It then proceeded to reject
the unjust enrichment claims, saying that the plaintiffs were “barred from
bringing unjust enrichment claims” where there is a valid and enforceable
agreement “which . . . covers the dispute between the parties.”219 Thus, even
though the privacy policies were not considered part of the contract, the mere
existence of a contract was sufficient to deny claims based on promises made
outside the contract.220 This view turns the concept of bargaining around a
default rule on its head. When parties fail to bargain around a default rule,
the default rules are still preempted.

211. Morales v. Grand Cru Assocs., 759 N.Y.S.2d 890, 890 (App. Div. 2003); see also D’Amato
v. Five Star Reporting, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 395, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining quantum meruit
and unjust enrichment “generally exist only where there is no express agreement between the
parties”).
212. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 cmt. c (AM. L. INST.
2011).
213. In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 953, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
214. Id.; Reed Abelson & Matthew Goldstein, Millions of Anthem Customers Targeted in
Cyberattack, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/business/
hackers-breached-data-of-millions-insurer-says.html [https://perma.cc/WRH9-JZGT].
215. In re Anthem, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 966.
216. Id. at 979–80.
217. Id. at 968–70. Apparently, the plaintiffs did not bring a claim under California law,
presumably because for a while California did not recognize unjust enrichment as a separate
cause of action. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
218. In re Anthem, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 980, 983 (addressing the California and New Jersey
breach of contract claims).
219. Id. at 984 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Clark–Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
516 N.E.2d 190, 193 (N.Y. 1987)).
220. See id. at 983–84.
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The problem is that decisions like In re Anthem often take a nuanced rule
that allows parties to opt out of unjust enrichment and misinterpret that rule
to say contracts broadly supplant unjust enrichment.221 In re Anthem relied on
Clark–Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island Rail Road Co. for its view of New York law.222
But Clark–Fitzpatrick provided a far more accurate interpretation of that rule
than In re Anthem. The relevant passage states: “It is impermissible, however,
to seek damages in an action sounding in quasi contract where the suing party
has fully performed on a valid written agreement, the existence of which is
undisputed, and the scope of which clearly covers the dispute between the
parties.”223
Contrary to the view in In re Anthem, this passage does not mean that the
existence of a contract and unjust enrichment are “mutually exclusive.”224
Clark–Fitzpatrick expressly states that preemption only occurs when the
contract “clearly covers the dispute between the parties.”225 Indeed, unjust
enrichment has been a remedy for breach of contract in New York at least
since the time of Judge Cardozo.226
That means unjust enrichment is only unavailable for some subset of
cases where the parties have contracts. Joseph Sternberg, Inc. v. Walber 36th
Street Assocs. relied on the same passage from Clark–Fitzpatrick but used the
language to show the difference between a contract that preempts unjust
enrichment and one that does not.227 In this case, the plaintiff, a broker
representing a buyer, negotiated a real estate purchase for $11.5 million.228
The contract specified his commission would be $450,000.229 However, the
buyer and seller concluded the negotiations without the broker and arrived
at a lower price of $10.6 million.230 The broker did not receive any commission,
and he sued for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud.231 The

221. See, e.g., Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating Restitution with
Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 988 (2011) (commenting
on TruGreen, Rendleman says, “The Utah court’s palpable misunderstanding of restitution is
illustrated by its misstatements . . . that restitution is used when the parties have no express contract,
which is only sometimes true.”).
222. In re Anthem, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 984.
223. Clark–Fitzpatrick, 516 N.E.2d at 193.
224. Joseph Sternberg, Inc. v. Walber 36th St. Assocs., 594 N.Y.S.2d 144, 145 (App. Div. 1993).
225. Clark–Fitzpatrick, 516 N.E.2d at 193.
226. Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1208, 1214–17
(1973) (analyzing Judge Cardozo’s opinion in Buccini v. Paterno Construction Co., 170 N.E. 910
(N.Y. 1930), and showing that unjust enrichment has been a contractual remedy in New York for
almost a century).
227. Joseph Sternberg, Inc., 594 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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court held that the existence of the contract did not bar the quasi-contract
claim, saying:
[I]f the brokerage agreement at issue had explicitly stated that, in
the event the sale did not proceed at the agreed price, plaintiff
would not be entitled to any commission, it would be indisputable
that nothing short of a sale at that price would entitle plaintiff to a
commission. The contract, however, does not so state and is silent as
to the plaintiff’s entitlement to a commission in the event a sale
occurred for a lesser price.232
Properly understood, unjust enrichment is only preempted when the contract
clearly demonstrates that the parties have bargained around it. Of course, the
flip side of this result is that unjust enrichment can be bargained around.
Unequal bargaining power may limit the ability of unjust enrichment to help
privacy victims.233 In Part IV, this Article delves further into this issue.
C. THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSE OF ACTION
The preceding Section described how unjust enrichment can serve as a
remedy in breach of contract actions. But as discussed earlier, privacy policies
are not always considered part of the contract between the business and its
customers.234 Indeed, companies often make representations that may not be
considered part of customer contracts. These promises may be found in a
privacy policy on the company’s website or in a letter to customers as the
company changes its privacy policy.235
Importantly, victims of data losses can resort to unjust enrichment even
if the broken promise is not part of a contract. Unjust enrichment is not just
a remedy; it can serve as its own cause of action.236 For example, in Blue Cross
232. Id. at 146.
233. See infra Section IV.B.
234. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text (identifying cases where privacy policies
were not contractual obligations).
235. See, e.g., Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (Sept. 30, 2020), https://policies.google.com/
privacy?hl=en-US [https://perma.cc/MES3-RU8Y]; In re: WhatsApp, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/whatsapp/#transfer [https://perma.cc/DWX2-KDUQ]
(discussing WhatsApp’s blog post announcing to customers it would share their data with
Facebook); A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.apple.com/customerletter [https://perma.cc/7P28-G7U3] (discussing Apple’s privacy promises to customers and
refusal to provide personal data to government).
236. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. a (AM. L. INST.
2011) (explaining how unjust enrichment is “an independent basis of liability” which has been
“carried forward” from the 1937 Restatement of Restitution); LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 176, at
644 (“Just as there are rules that impose liability in tort and contract, there are rules that impose
liability in unjust enrichment.”); Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU
L. REV. 1577, 1582 (2002) (“Restitution as a basis of liability parallel to contract and tort has
been called ‘freestanding’ restitution . . . .” (quoting Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution
in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 886
(1999))).
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Health Services, Inc. v. Sauer, the Missouri Court of Appeals awarded a money
judgement to an insurance company that had mistakenly paid benefits to
the defendant after his policy had terminated.237 The defendant had not
breached a contract nor committed a tort; rather, Blue Cross was able to
recover because the defendant was “unjustly enriched.”238
Privacy claims untethered from other wrongs (including breach of
contract) can find support in section 44 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment, titled “Interference with Other Protected Interests.”239
Specifically, subsection (1) states: “A person who obtains a benefit by
conscious interference with a claimant’s legally protected interests (or in
consequence of such interference by another) is liable in restitution as
necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, unless competing legal objectives
make such liability inappropriate.”240 The comments specifically mention
that “[p]rofitable interference with . . . [a] claimant’s right of privacy, gives
rise to a claim under § 44 if the benefit to the defendant is susceptible of
measurement.”241 One illustration explains that when a local pharmacy sells
its customers’ prescription records to a national chain without permission, the
customers have a cause of action in unjust enrichment against both the local
pharmacy and the national chain.242 Importantly, the customers can recover
both proceeds of the sale from the local pharmacy and any additional profits
the national chain derived.243
Still some courts have failed to understand that there can be a cause of
action for unjust enrichment. Decisions addressing unjust enrichment claims
in both California and Texas have been all over the map.244 Intermediate
appellate courts in both jurisdictions have stubbornly refused to recognize
unjust enrichment as a separate cause of action despite the respective state

237. Blue Cross Health Servs., Inc. v. Sauer, 800 S.W.2d 72, 76–77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
238. Id. at 75.
239. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 44 (AM. L. INST.
2011).
240. Id.
241. Id. § 44 cmt. b.
242. Id. § 44 cmt. b, illus. 10. Illustration 10 is based on Anonymous v. CVS Corp., in which the
predicate wrongful act was violating the “pharmacist’s professional obligation of nondisclosure.”
Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d 333, 340 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
243. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 44 cmt. b, illus. 10
(AM. L. INST. 2011).
244. See Douglas L. Johnson & Neville L. Johnson, What Happened to Unjust Enrichment in
California? The Deterioration of Equity in the California Courts, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 277, 291 (2010)
(discussing California’s “schizophrenic treatment of unjust enrichment”); George P. Roach,
Unjust Enrichment in Texas: Is it a Floor Wax or a Dessert Topping?, 65 BAYLOR L. REV. 153, 204 (2013)
(noting that “[d]espite . . . ten Texas Supreme Court opinions . . . that hold or acknowledge
unjust enrichment as a cause of action,” there is a recent controversy over whether it is a cause of
action).
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supreme courts saying that the cause of action exists.245 This Section will focus
on how California has addressed the unjust enrichment cause of action. Given
that so many technology companies are headquartered there, many privacy
lawsuits take place in federal district courts in California.246
A 1996 California Supreme Court decision, Ghirardo v. Antonioli,
expressly recognized a cause of action for unjust enrichment, saying “[t]he
claim [of unjust enrichment] was adequately pleaded and proved” in a real
estate case.247 This statement was not a mere afterthought. The court went
into some detail describing the cause of action:
Under the law of restitution, an individual may be required to make
restitution if he is unjustly enriched at the expense of another. A
person is enriched if he receives a benefit at another’s expense. The
term “benefit” “denotes any form of advantage.” Thus, a benefit is
conferred not only when one adds to the property of another, but
also when one saves the other from expense or loss.248
Nevertheless, subsequent federal and state decisions have repeatedly said that
no cause of action for unjust enrichment existed under California law.249
Many of these decisions were privacy cases.250 For example, the plaintiffs in
Fraley v. Facebook were not allowed to pursue a cause of action for unjust
enrichment when Facebook introduced a “Sponsored Story” advertisement
program without the plaintiffs’ consent.251 Facebook sold advertisements that
showed customers’ names and photos to their friends when they liked a
business (e.g., “Angel Frolicker likes Rosetta Stone”).252

245. For discussion of the California cases, see infra notes 249–52 and accompanying text.
For discussion of the Texas cases, see Roach, supra note 244, at 216 & nn.323 & 325.
246. See Daniel R. Stoller, California Courts Set Privacy Litigation Standards for Big Tech,
BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 15, 2019, 3:31 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-datasecurity/california-courts-set-privacy-litigation-standards-for-big-tech [https://perma.cc/L9DE86DQ].
247. Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 924 P.2d 996, 1005 (Cal. 1996).
248. Id. at 1003 (citations omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 1
cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1937)).
249. See Ferrington v. McAfee, Inc., No. 10-CV-01455–LHK, 2010 WL 3910169, at *17 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 5, 2010) (“The Court also notes that there is no cause of action for unjust enrichment
under California law.”); Robinson v. HSBC Bank USA, 732 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987 (N.D. Cal. 2010);
Levine v. Blue Shield of Cal., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 278 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding “[t]here is no
cause of action in California for unjust enrichment” (alteration in original) (quoting Durell v.
Sharp Healthcare, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 682, 699 (Ct. App. 2010))); Melchior v. New Line Prods.,
Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 347, 357 (Ct. App. 2003).
250. See Pirozzi v. Apple, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 909, 924 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Low v. LinkedIn
Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“California does not recognize a standalone cause of action for unjust enrichment . . . .”); In re iPhone Application Litig., No.
11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011).
251. Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 791–92, 814–15 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
252. Id. at 791 (quoting Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages ¶¶ 65–68,
Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (No. 11-CV-01726-LHK)). The court did allow the plaintiffs to request
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At the same time, a few decisions including at least one privacy case
arrived at the opposite conclusion and recognized unjust enrichment as a
distinct cause of action.253 Douglas and Neville Johnson have provided a
thorough account of how California found itself in this mess.254 The story
involves following dated appellate court precedent while somehow missing
Ghirardo v. Antonioli.255 Decisions omitting Ghirardo are surprising because
Ghirardo is controlling precedent from the California Supreme Court and was
decided later in time than the precedent courts followed instead.256 This
created a split, with some decisions even wrongly arguing that Ghirardo did
not endorse an unjust enrichment cause of action.257
In 2015, the California Supreme Court appeared to finally put the issue
to rest in Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v. J.R. Marketing.258 The court held
that an insurer could assert a claim for unjust enrichment directly against
Cumis counsel to recover any excessive fees.259 Importantly, unjust enrichment
was not dependent on some other theory of liability. Citing to both Ghirardo
and Restatement section 1, Hartford Casualty said the doctrine applied “even if
no contract between the parties itself expresses or implies such a

unjust enrichment as a remedy for some of their other statutory claims that expressly allowed for
disgorgement. Id. at 815.
253. Hernandez v. Path, Inc., No. 12-CV-01515 YGR, 2012 WL 5194120, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 19, 2012) (regarding data privacy issues, “there is a cause of action for unjust enrichment
under California law”); see also Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1167
(9th Cir. 1996) (“Under both California and New York law, unjust enrichment is an action in
quasi-contract . . . .”); Hawthorne v. Umpqua Bank, No. C-11-6700 YGR, 2012 WL 1458194, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2012) (“The weight of authority . . . supports a determination that ‘unjust
enrichment’ is a proper claim for relief, or cause of action, under California law.”); Peterson v.
Cellco P’ship, 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 316, 323 (Ct. App. 2008) (reciting the elements of an unjust
enrichment claim); Hirsch v. Bank of Am., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 229–30 (Ct. App. 2003)
(finding that plaintiffs stated a valid claim for unjust enrichment where banks collected and
retained excessive fees passed through to plaintiffs by title companies); Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank,
91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 881, 882–83 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding that the evidence supported the jury’s
verdict of unjust enrichment).
254. See generally Johnson & Johnson, supra note 244 (analyzing the evolution of unjust
enrichment as a cause of action in California courts).
255. Id. at 287–88. Johnson and Johnson discuss how the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California failed to cite Ghirardo v. Antonioli in Walker v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co.
Id.; see Walker v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1174 (E.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d sub nom.
Walker v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 558 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2009).
256. Johnson & Johnson, supra note 244, at 287.
257. Id. at 288–89; see, e.g., Vincent Consol. Commodities, Inc. v. Am. Trading & Transfer,
LLC, No. 07-CV-20 W (LSP), 2007 WL 9646371, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 2007) (dismissing claim
because “California does not recognize a separate claim for unjust enrichment” and inaccurately
stating that the Ghirardo court “merely mentioned a ‘cause of action for unjust enrichment’ in
passing” (quoting Ghirardo v. Antoniolo, 924 P.2d 996, 1003 (Cal. 1996))).
258. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. J.R. Mktg., LLC, 353 P.3d 319, 332 (Cal. 2015).
259. Id. at 321–22. When an “insurer initially refuse[s] to defend [an] insured against a thirdparty lawsuit” and is compelled by court order to do so, the independent counsel hired by the
insurer under a reservation of rights is often called Cumis counsel. Id. at 321.
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[restitutionary] duty.”260 These citations are significant because both the
Restatement and Ghirardo recognize a cause of action for unjust enrichment.
Most subsequent courts applying California law now recognize that unjust
enrichment is a cause of action.261
This recognition has the potential to reinvigorate privacy claims in
California. For example, In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile
Litigation, the plaintiffs raised a number of claims based on the improper
disclosure of their information to third parties as part of the Cambridge
Analytica scandal.262 Citing to Hartford Casualty, inter alia, the decision denied
the defendant’s motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim.263
Importantly, a passage from the decision noted that “even if the plaintiffs
suffered no economic loss from the disclosure of their information, they may
proceed . . . on a claim for unjust enrichment to recover the gains that [the
defendant] realized from its allegedly improper conduct.”264 This passage
reveals why the nature of an unjust enrichment claim can avoid many pitfalls
associated with other claims. Even when the harm to the victims is intangible,
the unjust enrichment claim can successfully help privacy victims.265
D. STANDING ON DEFENDANT’S GAIN
Another advantage of relying on unjust enrichment is that standing
should not be a serious obstacle. Because the monetary remedy is based on
the defendant’s unjust gain and not the victims’ injuries, courts cannot point
to the amorphous nature of privacy victims’ injuries to dismiss their cases for
lack of standing. Importantly, privacy victims may not just have standing
to bring unjust enrichment claims, they may be able to bootstrap unjust
enrichment to gain standing to recover statutory damages.
A group of leading restitution and remedies scholars has previously made
these arguments in an amicus brief in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.266 As an initial
260. Id. at 326.
261. Williams v. Facebook, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (noting that
California has clarified its position and now allows a claim for unjust enrichment); In re Vizio,
Inc., Consumer Priv. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1233–34 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (denying defendants’
motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ California unjust enrichment claims). But see Brodsky v. Apple Inc.,
No. 19-CV-00712-LHK, 2019 WL 4141936, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2019) (failing, still, to
recognize unjust enrichment “as a stand-alone cause of action” and dismissing claim).
262. In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., 402 F. Supp. 3d 767, 776 (N.D.
Cal. 2019).
263. Id. at 803.
264. Id.; see also Williams, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 1050 (“The complaint need not include
economic injury to establish standing for . . . unjust enrichment claims.”).
265. This decision also takes a less restrictive view of how the plaintiffs’ injuries fit into other
doctrines like standing and breach of contract. In re Facebook, 402 F. Supp. 3d at 785–87, 802.
266. Brief of Restitution and Remedies Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339), 2015 WL 5302537, at *1–3
[hereinafter Restitution and Remedies Scholars’ Brief]. The brief was written by Douglas
Laycock, Mark Gergen, and Doug Rendleman. Both Laycock and Rendleman have written
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matter, the Restitution and Remedies Scholars’ Brief explained what is
required to show standing for unjust enrichment: “Standing to sue in unjust
enrichment requires plaintiff to show that he is the source of defendant’s
enrichment, either in the sense that he suffered a loss that corresponds to
defendant’s gain, or in the sense that defendant’s gain was acquired by
violating plaintiff’s rights.”267 Notice what is not mentioned. Standing for
restitution does not require that plaintiffs establish that they were injured or
harmed.268 That is because restitution is based on the defendant’s gain, not
the plaintiff’s loss. This point is uncontroversial and a foundational tenet of
restitution.269
Numerous causes of action allow a plaintiff to recover the defendant’s
unjust enrichment without requiring the plaintiff to show additional harm.
The Restitution and Remedies Scholars’ Brief identified ten diverse categories
of lawsuits that illustrate this principle and described examples in each
category. These categories are: (1) commercial bribes and kickbacks;
(2) business opportunities; (3) other conflicts of interest; (4) misuse of
confidential information; (5) forfeiture of fees; (6) intellectual property
infringement; (7) trespass; (8) conversion; (9) rescission; and (10) the slayer
rule.270
The rules are straightforward and intuitive. Consider bribes and
kickbacks. A company can recover the wrongdoer’s gain even if the company
was unharmed.271 The same principle applies to wrongdoing by different types
of fiduciaries.272 Companies can recover profits their agent made from
wrongfully taking a corporate opportunity without showing the company
would have actually taken advantage of that opportunity had it been

leading casebooks in this area. Id. at app. *1A–2A. The signatories also included Andrew Kull,
the Reporter of Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, and several Advisers and
Members Consultative Group participants for that Restatement. Id.
267. Id. at *3 (emphasis omitted).
268. See Williams, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 1050 (“The complaint need not include economic injury
to establish standing for . . . unjust enrichment claims.”).
269. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 112, § 1.1, at 4 (“[R]estitution is measured by
defendant’s gains, not by plaintiff’s losses.”); 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 51
(1978) (“[I]n the damage action the plaintiff seeks to recover for the harm done to him, whereas
in the restitution action he seeks to recover the gain acquired by the defendant through the
wrongful act.”).
270. Restitution and Remedies Scholars’ Brief, supra note 266, at *7–18.
271. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 cmt. d, illus. 17–19
(AM. L. INST. 2011) (“The taking of a bribe or ‘secret commission’ is condemned, without regard
to economic injury, because it poses a risk of divided loyalty.”); id. § 44 cmt. b, illus. 9 & reporter’s
note b.
272. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2006) (“To establish that
the agent is subject to liability, it is not necessary that the principal show that the agent’s
acquisition of a material benefit harmed the principal.”).
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available.273 One prominent example of this principle is found in Jackson v.
Smith. In that case, the receiver for the plaintiff arranged to sell the plaintiff’s
land at auction.274 A group that included the receiver was the highest bidder
and later resold the land for a profit.275 Even though the Supreme Court
recognized “that the sale was fairly conducted[,] that there was competitive
bidding,” and “the estate may not have been injured,” the Court awarded the
plaintiff the defendants’ entire profits based on breach of fiduciary duty.276 In
short, disgorgement was awarded even though there was no evidence that the
defendants’ conduct made the plaintiff worse off. In fact, by making the
highest bid, the defendants may have actually made the plaintiff better off.
Claims of conversion are also analogous to the claims data privacy victims
make because successful conversion plaintiffs need not show harm. In a
typical conversion case, a defendant uses the plaintiff’s property without
permission. This is similar to privacy cases where companies use or sell their
customers’ data without customer permission. As in many privacy cases, the
conversion plaintiff may have suffered no concrete injury. Yet under the law
of restitution, the plaintiff can still recover based on unjust enrichment.277 For
example, in Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., the plaintiff’s egg-washing machine was
stored next to the defendant’s premises.278 The defendant proceeded to use
the machine for three years without permission.279 The plaintiff eventually
learned of the defendant’s conversion and sued for unjust enrichment.280 In
response, the defendant argued the plaintiff was not damaged because the
plaintiff had not been using the machine during the three-year period.281 The
Supreme Court of Washington rejected this argument, finding injury in the
defendant’s violation of the plaintiff’s property rights.282

273. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 cmt. d, illus. 15
(AM. L. INST. 2011) (showing corporation allowed to recover wrongful gain even though both
parties conceded that corporation would not have taken advantage of the opportunity).
274. Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 587 (1921).
275. Id. at 587–88.
276. Id. at 587, 589.
277. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 cmt. c, illus. 3 (AM.
L. INST. 2011). In this illustration, the developer temporally stores dirt on the owner’s lot without
permission. Id. Even though the owner “has suffered no quantifiable injury,” the developer is
liable in restitution “measured by the rental value of [the property] during the months the dirt
was present, liberally estimated.” Id.
278. Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652, 652 (Wash. 1946).
279. Id. at 653.
280. Id. The plaintiff waived his cause of action based on the tort of conversion and elected
to pursue unjust enrichment, presumably because the remedy in restitution was more valuable in
this case. See id. at 654.
281. See id. at 653.
282. Id. at 654; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1965)
(“[A]ny intrusion upon land in the possession of another is an injury, and, if not privileged, gives
rise to a cause of action even though the intrusion is beneficial, or so transitory that it constitutes
no interference with or detriment to the land or its beneficial enjoyment.”).
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These are but a few of the many unjust enrichment examples the
Restitution and Remedies Scholars’ Brief describes in detail. The entire group
of examples is diverse along several dimensions. These examples span tort,
contract, property, and agency law.283 Decisions are found in state and federal
court (including the U.S. Supreme Court) cases decided in each of the last
four centuries.284 In short, there is an incredibly well-established body of law
that demonstrates that courts have adjudicated claims for unjust enrichment
despite lack of harm to the plaintiff. The vast majority of these cases do not
even mention standing because it is taken as a given.
Standing should operate no differently for plaintiffs in privacy cases that
bring claims based in unjust enrichment. As the Supreme Court established
in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, standing depends on the relief sought.285 Thus,
plaintiffs’ lack of standing to recover compensatory damages should not
affect their standing with respect to claims for unjust enrichment. Indeed, in
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. the Supreme Court
found that the plaintiff had standing to seek disgorgement of the defendant’s
profits even when it could not “quantify its losses with sufficient certainty to
recover damages.”286 Because the plaintiff, Static Control, was pursuing false
advertising claims under the Lanham Act, the decision dealt with standing in
the context of statutory violations,287 but the larger point remains: standing
for a claim seeking disgorgement does not require any harm to the plaintiff.
In most privacy cases, the defendant’s enrichment is certainly concrete
and should satisfy standing’s injury in fact requirement. For example, if a
company sells customer data in violation of its own privacy policy, the
proceeds from that sale constitute the company’s wrongful gains and should
confer standing on the plaintiffs. This theory emerged in 2020 when the
Ninth Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to base standing in a
privacy case on unjust enrichment. In In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking
Litigation, the plaintiffs alleged that Facebook impermissibly sold user data to
advertisers.288 Facebook contended “that unjust enrichment is not sufficient
to confer standing” and that the plaintiffs must demonstrate some harm to
themselves.289 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument stating that the
283. Restitution and Remedies Scholars’ Brief, supra note 266, at *6–21. See generally, e.g.,
Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing Se., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604 (2000) (breach of contract);
Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936) (property); Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d
801 (Minn. 1952) (agency); Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231 (Va. 1946) (tort).
284. See Restitution and Remedies Scholars’ Brief, supra note 266, at *6–21; see, e.g., Mobil Oil,
530 U.S. at 607; Edwards, 96 S.W.2d at 1032–33; Ex p Lacey (1802) 31 Eng. Rep. 1228, 1228; 6
Ves. Jun. 626, 626; Keech v. Sandford (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223, 223; Sel. Cas. T. King 61, 61.
285. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 & n.6 (1983) (differentiating between
standing to seek an injunction and standing for money damages).
286. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 135 (2014).
287. Id. at 122–23.
288. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 600 (9th Cir. 2020).
289. Id. at 599.
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“[p]laintiffs sufficiently alleged a state law interest [namely, unjust
enrichment] whose violation constitutes an injury sufficient to establish
standing to bring their [state statutory claims and common law claims].”290
The same kind of analysis should confer standing to victims of data breaches.
In these cases, the unjust enrichment would simply be the wrongful savings
the company enjoyed because it did not deploy reasonable data security
precautions. These remedies are all concrete and should provide privacy
plaintiffs with constitutional standing.
Importantly, unjust enrichment may give standing to privacy victims
when they seek statutory damages. Consider the Cable Communications
Policy Act, which requires cable companies to destroy personally identifiable
information after it “is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it
was collected.”291 The statute gives individuals a private cause of action and
allows them to recover “actual damages but not less than liquidated damages
computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000,
whichever is higher.”292 When plaintiffs brought class action lawsuits alleging
two different cable companies violated this statute, both the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits dismissed the complaints based on standing.293 Because there
was no evidence that the plaintiffs’ information had been misused, there were
no injuries to provide standing.
Unjust enrichment can change that analysis. The Restatement explains
that the violation of a statutory duty can support a claim for unjust
enrichment.294 Relying on this theory, plaintiffs can recast their allegations in
ways that confer standing.295 Under the Cable Communications Policy Act,
the defendants had a statutory duty to institute a program that regularly
deleted unnecessary personal information.296 They did not do so.
Consequently, the defendants unjustly saved money by refusing to provide the
services they were obligated to supply. Even if the savings are small, unjust
290. Id. at 601.
291. 47 U.S.C. § 551(e) (2018).
292. Id. § 551(f)(2)(A).
293. Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he absence
. . . of any concrete injury inflicted or likely to be inflicted on the plaintiff . . . requires that we
affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s suit for want of standing.”);
Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that plaintiff
lacked standing “without a plausible allegation that [defendant’s] mere retention of the
[personal] information caused any concrete and particularized harm to the value of that
information”).
294. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 44 cmt. b (AM. L. INST.
2011) (“[C]ompetitive practices prohibited by law, such as deceptive marketing, support a claim
in restitution by the rule of this section.”).
295. This tactic is different from simply pursuing a claim for unjust enrichment based on a
statutory violation. While section 44 certainly does provide for that possibility, disgorgement “is
not available where the claim would conflict with limits imposed by other law on the defendant’s
liability or on the claimant’s remedies for the wrong.” Id. § 44 cmt. d.
296. Gubala, 846 F.3d at 910; Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 927.
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enrichment provides a path to statutory damages. Of course, this tactic does
not just apply to the Cable Communications Policy Act. Standing presents an
obstacle to recovering damages under many privacy statutes including, for
example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Washington, D.C.’s Use of Consumer
Identification Information Act, and the Stored Communications Act.297
Unjust enrichment has the potential to aid plaintiffs seeking statutory
damages in all these contexts.
IV. COMPLICATIONS
The law of restitution and unjust enrichment is flexible and far reaching.
Part IV discusses various complications that would accompany the use of
unjust enrichment in privacy law. These include: (1) potential extensions of
the theory; (2) an important limitation: the ability to contract out of some
parts of unjust enrichment; and (3) complications with calculating unjust
enrichment.
A. OTHER BASES FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT
This Article has focused on using unjust enrichment to respond to
broken privacy promises. Consequently, the Article has described how unjust
enrichment can serve as a remedy for breach of contract and as an
independent cause of action based on a broken promise. However, unjust
enrichment as a cause of action is not limited to addressing broken promises.
Many other “wrongful” acts have potential to trigger an unjust enrichment
claim.
Sections 40–44 of the Restatement describe various types of these wrongful
acts.298 They range from trespass to interference with intellectual property
rights. But two particular wrongs stand out as potential bases for unjust
enrichment in the privacy context. They are statutory violations299 and breach
of fiduciary or confidential obligations.300
As mentioned earlier, the violation of a statutory duty can support a claim
for unjust enrichment.301 Moreover, the list of statutes protecting data privacy
is expanding rapidly. There are now statutes that deal with how companies
297. See Haley, supra note 9, at 1225–29 (assessing when plaintiffs were denied standing when
bringing various different statutory claims); see also, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540,
1545 (2016) (remanding for further consideration of standing requirements where a plaintiff
sued for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act); Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d
511, 512 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (denying standing to plaintiffs who asserted violations of Washington,
D.C.’s Use of Consumer Identification Information Act).
298. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 40–44 (AM. L. INST.
2011). The Restitution and Remedies Scholars’ Brief in the Spokeo case also surveys many of the
wrongs that can lead to unjust enrichment claims. See supra notes 266–70 and accompanying text.
299. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 44 (AM. L. INST.
2011).
300. Id. § 43.
301. See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text.
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handle credit reports, record credit card information, store personally
identifiable information, or even use biometric data.302 The violation of any
of these statutes can potentially trigger a cause of action in unjust enrichment.
Importantly, some of the statutes do not just apply to companies that have a
relationship with the aggrieved party, but to third party data brokers. For
example, the new California Consumer Privacy Act allows individuals to
demand that data brokers delete their personal information.303
To be sure, the viability of an unjust enrichment claim depends on the
statute. Disgorgement is not available where the claim would conflict with
limits imposed by a given statute.304 In other words, legislatures can draft
statutes to opt out of unjust enrichment. Presumably, that means that an
unjust enrichment claim is not viable if the legislature barred a private cause
of action. But what if the statute is silent? Frankly, most legislators probably
are not thinking of unjust enrichment as they draft privacy laws.305 In these
cases, the default rule is that there is a claim for unjust enrichment because
there is no conflict with the statute.
Finally, Jack Balkin has recently argued that companies that keep
individuals’ private information should be considered information fiduciaries.306
Alicia Solow-Niederman has expanded this idea, suggesting “data confidant”
as a new category of fiduciary that could be tailored to fit commercial holders
of consumer data.307 Like other fiduciaries, data confidants would be legally
obligated to securely maintain consumer data regardless of whether they had
explicit contractual agreements with the data owner.308 That certainly is not
the law now. The act of storing a consumer’s data imposes no fiduciary duties
on companies like Google, Facebook, or American Express. But if the law
moves in that direction, there are important implications for restitution and
unjust enrichment. Historically, unjust enrichment has been a common

302. See supra note 297 and accompanying text; 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/20 (West 2008).
303. See Press Release, State of Cal. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Becerra Reminds
Consumers of Data Privacy Rights Under the California Consumer Privacy Act (June 30, 2020),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-reminds-consumers-dataprivacy-rights-under-california [https://perma.cc/3Z9R-7KUR]; see also Scholz, supra note 43, at
663–81 (discussing how restitution and unjust enrichment might apply to third party data
traffickers even before the enactment of statutes like the California Consumer Privacy Act).
304. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 44 cmt. d (AM. L. INST.
2011).
305. As mentioned earlier, most attorneys, lawmakers, and judges are no longer familiar with
restitution and unjust enrichment. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
306. See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1183, 1186 (2016); cf. Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries,
133 HARV. L. REV. 497, 500–02 (2019) (identifying supporters of the information fiduciary
concept but then criticizing the theory).
307. Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law Approach
for Data Breaches, 127 YALE. L.J.F. 614, 625 (2018).
308. Id.
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remedy for breaches of fiduciary duties.309 Therefore, if a company breaches
its duty as an information fiduciary and there are either wrongful gains
or savings associated with that breach, there should be a viable unjust
enrichment claim. In short, this Article’s focus on applying unjust enrichment
to broken promises is simply the first step in reviving unjust enrichment more
generally in the privacy context.
B. CONTRACTING AROUND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
I do not want to overstate the benefits of the use of restitution and unjust
enrichment in privacy law. It is not a panacea for all the problems that privacy
victims face. If victims begin successfully asserting unjust enrichment against
companies, the inevitable response will be efforts to limit liability. To the
extent that unjust enrichment serves as a remedy for a breach of contract, it
can plainly be bargained around.310 This would obviously limit the benefits of
the current proposal.
Indeed, “bargaining” is a misnomer as applied to customer adhesion
contracts; contracting out of unjust enrichment will not be difficult. That is
precisely what happened in In re Sony Gaming Networks.311 Sony’s PlayStation
Network allowed Sony console owners to purchase videogames and play
multiplayer games.312 Unfortunately, hackers broke into the system and were
able to obtain personal information on over 75 million accounts worldwide.313
The hackers not only took basic identifying information like names,
addresses, email addresses, and birthdates, but they may have also taken credit
card information and answers to security questions.314
The plaintiffs brought a class action against Sony alleging a variety of
causes of actions including negligence, breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
and various statutory violations.315 As usual, tort claims were dismissed because

309. See supra notes 272–76 and accompanying text (discussing Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S.
586 (1921)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 (AM. L.
INST. 2011) (“A person who obtains a benefit . . . in breach of a fiduciary duty . . . is liable in
restitution to the person to whom the duty is owed.”); Roberts, Disgorging Emoluments, supra note
199, at 22 (“A classic basis for wrongfulness [for disgorgement] is a fiduciary breach.”).
310. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(2) (AM. L. INST.
2011) (“A valid contract defines the obligations of the parties as to matters within its scope,
displacing to that extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment.”).
311. In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942,
984 (S.D. Cal.), order corrected, MDL No. 11md2258 AJB (MDD), 2014 WL 12603117 (S.D. Cal.
Feb. 10, 2014); see also Bass v. Facebook, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1040–41 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(“[Plaintiffs’] four breach of contract claims and the breach of confidence claim cannot move
forward because of the limitation-of-liability clause.”).
312. In re Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 953.
313. Emily Chung, PlayStation Data Breach Deemed in ‘Top 5 Ever,’ CBC (Apr. 27, 2011, 10:59
AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/playstation-data-breach-deemed-in-top-5-ever-1.1059548
[https://perma.cc/3L4F-2FEL].
314. Id.
315. In re Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 959.
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those data losses were not cognizable injuries.316 In support of its contract and
unjust enrichment claims, plaintiffs alleged that Sony broke its promise to
provide adequate security, a representation that Sony made in its privacy
policies.317 The court dismissed these claims because Sony’s privacy policy
expressly disclaimed responsibility for keeping its customers’ data safe.318
While In re Sony Gaming Networks illustrates the limits of unjust
enrichment, it is unlikely that all companies would be willing to disclaim
responsibility for taking reasonable data security measures. Sony’s services
concerned gaming where consumer expectations of privacy may not be as
strong as they are with respect to essential services. Consumers likely have
higher expectations of privacy from banks, health care providers, and
companies entrusted with particularly sensitive information. In industries
where part of the core business is to safeguard customers’ private information,
companies may be less able to disclaim data protection responsibility.
Moreover, there are limits to the ability of companies to contract out of
their obligations. Unjust enrichment claims may be based on the violation of
statutes or even on negligence. In these cases, it is far less clear that companies
can avoid unjust enrichment by simply adding a clause in an adhesion contract.
Most states do not allow parties to contract out of gross negligence.319 Some
states even limit the ability of parties to contract out of negligence when there
is an adhesion contract.320 Furthermore, clauses that seek to contract out of
statutory obligations are also unenforceable.321 Thus, while the first step in
raising unjust enrichment claims may lie in contract, the future of this theory
may depend on the ability of privacy victims to find other “wrongs” that cannot
be contracted around.
C. CALCULATING UNJUST ENRICHMENT
If there is widespread adoption of unjust enrichment and restitution in
privacy cases as this Article advocates, courts will have to determine precisely
how much money to disgorge. Many of these calculations will not be as simple

316. Id. at 966–73.
317. Id. at 982.
318. Id. at 983.
319. See Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (“An exculpatory
agreement . . . [may not] shield against a claim for willful and wanton negligence.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 195(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“A term exempting a party
from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy.”).
320. See, e.g., Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 747 (Conn. 2005)
(acknowledging it was adopting a minority view and finding that a clause in an adhesion contract
that sought to absolve the defendant for negligence was unenforceable as violating public policy).
321. See, e.g., 1 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 679 (11th ed. 2017) (“[In
California,] contract exempting from liability for ordinary negligence is valid where no public
interest is involved . . . . But there can be no exemption . . . for . . . gross negligence, or violation
of law.” (citations omitted)).

A2_CHAO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

604

1/15/2021 4:23 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:555

as they might appear. This Section does not purport to provide a
comprehensive description of how to make these calculations. Instead, this
Section merely identifies some issues that will likely arise as courts seek to
determine how to calculate disgorgement in privacy cases.
Courts will have to determine how much money the defendant would
have made had it not committed a wrong. That is because the amount
disgorged is based on the money the defendant made from the wrongful
conduct. Presumably, a court will simply subtract the money the defendant
would have made in the absence of wrongful conduct. But this exercise in
“but for” causation is not that simple.
Litigants will undoubtedly argue over what would have happened if the
defendant had not engaged in any wrongful conduct. There are often many
possible “counterfactuals” to select from. Consider a situation where a
company sells both customers’ location data and purchase history. Assume
selling the customers’ location information was wrongful (perhaps, because it
violated its own privacy policy or a statute), but selling the customers’ purchase
history was permissible. There are at least two potential counterfactuals.
First, the company might not have sold any customer information. In
this case, a court could disgorge all the profits from the sale. However, the
Restatement says that courts “may make such apportionments [and] may
recognize such credits or deductions . . . as reason and fairness dictate.”322
Thus, a court could seek to estimate how much profit is attributable to the
location information and only award that amount. But that approach is not
automatic. The Restatement says that “fairness” should be considered. Mark
Gergen takes this suggestion one step further and argues that courts should
consider the necessity of deterring wrongdoing and not awarding “gain from
trade” (meaning wealth attributable to both the wrong and wealth the
claimant may have earned absent the wrong).323 Under this approach, awards
could be “reasonable multiples” of what the parties would have negotiated.324
Plainly, courts will have to address what factors warrant applying (or not
applying) apportionments and credits.
Another counterfactual helps us understand causation in restitution. The
same company might seek to prove that it simply would have changed its
privacy policy to permit the sale and that customers would nonetheless have
agreed to that change (as they often do with adhesion contracts). Under this
last scenario, the company would have made precisely the same amount of

322. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(5) (AM. L. INST.
2011).
323. Gergen, supra note 134, at 850. The Restatement also rejects apportionment in some
cases. Section 51, comment f explains that where “the defendant embezzles $100 and invests the
money in shares that he later sells for $500,” the claimant should recover $500 partly based on
causation and partly because of deterrence. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2011).
324. Gergen, supra note 134, at 850.
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money if it had not broken its promise. Thus, the defendant could reasonably
argue that there are no profits to disgorge.
Now one might think that choosing between these two counterfactuals is
merely an exercise in proof. In other words, the counterfactual that can be
shown to be the one that was most likely to have occurred in the absence
of wrongdoing is the one the court should use. However, Gergen has
persuasively argued that is not what courts actually do. Instead, courts resolve
causal uncertainty “against a wrongdoer when [the] conduct is ‘deemed
wrongful precisely because it has a strong propensity to cause the type of harm
that ensued.’”325 For the company that wrongfully sells customer data, that
would suggest that courts should ignore the second counterfactual (company
changes privacy policy to allow what it did). That is true even if the evidence
shows that counterfactual was more likely to occur. Instead, courts should
use the first counterfactual (company does not sell data) to calculate
disgorgement. That is because to award nothing fails to provide any
deterrence.326 The primary point of this example is to show that calculating
the proper amount of money to disgorge is more than simply looking at
causation. Courts should look to both fairness and equity to determine the
end amount.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to address a set of data privacy law’s most intractable
problems. Traditional legal claims are poorly suited for handling privacy
losses. Contract and tort claims suffer from a variety of problems including:
privacy policies are not part of consumer contracts; consumers rarely read or
rely on privacy policies; the inability to trace harm to any specific data breach
(i.e., causation); and the economic loss rule. Even worse, courts have also said
that privacy injuries are not sufficiently concrete to serve as an element of
damages for various causes of action. Courts have even held that many of these
injuries fail to satisfy the Constitution’s basic standing requirement.
Fortunately, the law of restitution and unjust enrichment has the
potential for breaking through this gauntlet. But courts have frequently
misunderstood this often-neglected doctrine, causing it to languish. This
Article clarifies various important misconceptions and explains why unjust
enrichment is well suited for addressing modern privacy wrongs. It explains
how unjust enrichment can serve as both a stand-alone cause of action and a
remedy for other claims. Properly understood, unjust enrichment should
allow privacy victims to disgorge the wrongful gains companies earn when
they break their privacy promises. This also means that victims are entitled to
recover any wrongful savings these companies retain when they use deficient

325. Id. at 840 (quoting Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 1999)).
326. Id. at 835 (saying that “wrongdoer[s] [are often] denied the opportunity to argue the
counterfactual involving the competing cause” based on policy and fairness considerations).
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cybersecurity. Ideally, increased understanding and implementation of unjust
enrichment will incentivize companies to take their privacy promises seriously
or finally face consequences.

